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CHAPTER
IV.

THE RIGHT TO SILENCE
I.
THE RIGHT TO SILENCE
HISTORICALLY AND TODAY
1. The origins of the right to silence
The insight that nobody can be expected to be the source of their own demise
can be traced back to Talmudic law.1 While the notion regularly crops up in
theological writings in the 11th and 12th centuries, the literature traditionally
designates England as the birthplace of the right not to incriminate oneself –
known as the “nemo tenetur” principle or, frequently used as a synonym of both
terms, as the right to silence. In 1641 the Star Chamber and the High
Commission were abolished and, with them the institution of ex officio oaths,
which obligated the accused to answer questions posed by their interrogators.2
However, the roots of the principle banning the institution of the ex officio oath
are not to be found in common law but rather stem from the ius commune applied
by the ecclesiastical courts and special courts (and applied throughout continental
Europe). Hence, in English legal practice it was precisely the persons tried by the
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1 Talmudic law did not recognize a waiver of this right. Confessing one’s guilt was meant to
serve purification before God, but this had not relevance from the standpoint of evidence. By
recognizing the privilege and by rejecting the probative force of a confession it was sought to
preclude the possibility of the witnesses of a criminal act evading their obligation to testify.
Testifying could result in disadvantages: for false testimony the punishment envisaged for the
crime the defendant in the case was charged with could be imposed, and in the case of a guilty
verdict the witnesses were compelled to participate in executing the judgment. Offenders,
however, were not allowed to provide testimony, and therefore those who did not wish to
take on the inconveniences of being a witness upon themselves could exclude themselves
from the scope of witnesses by “confessing” to a crime they did not commit. See Klaus Rogall:
Der Beschuldigte als Beweismittel gegen sich selbst. Berlin, 1977, Duncker & Humblot, pp. 68–69
(Hereinafter: Rogall, Der Beschuldigte).
2 John H. Langbein: The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-incrimination at
Common Law. Michigan Law Review, vol. 92, March 1994, p. 1073 (Hereinafter: Langbein,
Historical Origins).
Star Chamber and the High Commission who first referred to the prohibition
on compelling self-incrimination.3 When in the 17th century common law
courts prohibited the High Commission from compelling religious “heretics” to
incriminate themselves, they did so with reference to the ius commune used by the
High Commission.4
But the principle of nemo tenetur mandated by the ius commune provided only
very limited protection when compared to the current interpretation of the
right to silence. This is hardly surprising, considering that the ecclesiastical
courts and the special courts followed the continental inquisitorial procedure,
and a recognition of the right to silence was hardly compatible with this. The
principle of nemo tenetur did not posit that the defendant was not obliged to
provide self-incriminating statements, but only forbade an individual, without
evidence substantiating the suspicion against her or without an indictment,
from being compelled to make public her own transgressions – heretic views
included.5 The principle did not ensure that the individual could refuse to
provide evidence that might incriminate herself, but merely put a prohibition
on compelling her to provide the basis for initiating proceedings against her.
The ius commune, therefore, rather served to ensure a minimum level of
freedom of expression, freedom of thought and conscience, as well as the
right to private life: nemo tenetur prodere seipsum – no one may be compelled to
denounce herself, or put differently nemo tenetur detegere turpitudinem suam – no
one can be obligated to reveal her shame. At the same time it also formulated
one of the elements of the principle of accusation: nemo punitur sine accusatore,
that is no one shall be prosecuted and punished unless there is an accuser.
Although the courts could initiate proceedings ex officio, one precondition of
such a proceeding was that the suspicion must be supported by at least the
requisite minimum of evidence.6 In summary: the principle of nemo tenetur
(whose application the common law courts demanded from the special
courts, which tried cases according to the principles of the inquisitorial
procedural order) did not guarantee a right to silence, but rather posited that
the individual’s duty to speak was triggered by a more or less clearly
formulated accusation or suspicion.
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3 R. H. Helmholz: Origins of the Privilege Against Self-incrimination: The Role of the
European Ius Commune. New York University Law Review, vol. 65, October 1990, p. 964
(Hereinafter: Helmholz, Origins).
4 Albert W. Alschuler: A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain
Silent. Michigan Law Review, vol. 94, August 1996, p. 2639 (Hereinafter: Alschuler, Privilege).
5 Alschuler, Privilege, p. 2640.
6 Helmholz, Origins, p. 975.
Academic literature today is divided as to whether at the time when the
ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber were abolished – or in the period
prior to it – the common law expressly recognized the right to silence. It is
established beyond doubt that when those charged for heretic views before
the High Commission argued against the legitimacy of ex officio oaths, they did
not refer to the rules of ius commune, but rather to natural law, divine laws, the
Magna Carta and occasionally also to the “law of the land”, that is common
law.7 At the same time, the sources also point out that it was only in the
second half of the 17th century that the right of the accused to deny making a
statement concerning the charges or to answer questions regarding her guilt
was recognized.8 The idea that the accused should be compelled to speak
during the evidentiary procedure did not arise: this is also illustrated by the
fact that as late as the end of the 19th century, the accused’s statement was not
recognized as an item of evidence of full value. The accused was not
precluded from expressing her views during the trial, nor from partaking in
the evidentiary procedure, for example by questioning the witnesses. But only
in 1898 was the accused’s right to make a statement under oath as a witness
for the defense recognized.9 When, therefore, in the 18th century legal
scholarship, representing Enlightenment ideals was at pains to abolish the
compulsion to speak on the Continent, in England it was the expansion of
the accused’s right to speak – in the interest of strengthening her procedural
position – that was on the agenda.
The right to silence – though recognized by common law earlier – only
became a genuinely applicable and practiced right at the end of the 18th
century, when the rules concerning the prohibition on the use of counsel
were eliminated.10 This is because as long as the involvement of defense
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7 For the presentation of the cases and the arguments see Rogall, Der Beschuldigte, pp. 76–81.
8 Rogall, Der Beschuldigte, p. 80.
9 K van Dijkhorst: The Right to Silence. Is the Game Worth the Candle? Available at:
www.isrcl.org/Papers/van%20Dijkhorst.pdf. By allowing her to testify as a witness, the accused’s
rights of defense were broadened. This process took place gradually: initially it was only the
witnesses of the prosecution who were allowed to appear before the jury, later those testifying in
defense of the accused were allowed as well, but they could not testify under oath. Swearing in the
defense witnesses and the accused’s right to summon witnesses were recognized at the beginning
of the 18th century. See M. Ploscowe: The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in
Europe and America. Harvard Law Review, vol. 48, 1935, pp. 456–457.
10 Rules excluding the defense counsel were gradually eliminated. The process lasted from the
end of the 17th century to the middle of the 19th century. See Langbein, Historical Origins, pp.
1047–1048.
counsel was limited, the only practicable way for the accused to defend
herself was to speak.11
The legislators and courts of the United States outdid their predecessors:
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution explicitly mentions the right not to
incriminate oneself: “No person (…) shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.”12 The Fifth Amendment, however, only
refers to proceedings before federal courts, though several petitions claimed
that the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from depriving
anyone of their life, liberty or property without due process of law, requires
that the privilege against self-incrimination be recognized by the states as
well. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this interpretation up until 1964,
arguing that the privilege against self-incrimination is not a conceptual
element of the due process that needs to be ensured by the states. In 1908, in
an opinion illustrative of its thinking at the time, the Supreme Court held:
“The wisdom of the exemption has never been universally assented to since
the days of Bentham many doubt it to-day, and it is best defended not as an
unchangeable principle of universal justice, but as a law proved by experience
to be expedient. (…) It has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free
countries outside the domain of the common law, and it is nowhere observed
among our own people in the search for truth outside the administration of
the law.”13
In 1964 the Supreme Court overruled its earlier case-law and since then the
prohibition on compelling individuals to incriminate themselves has been
binding for the states as well.14 In its Miranda decision15 two years later, the
Supreme Court ruled that the police were obliged to inform persons they
arrested of their rights – the right to silence among them – before beginning
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11 Until then “the trial became a series of excited altercations between the prisoner and the
different counsel opposed to him. Every statement of the counsel operated as a question to
the prisoner, and indeed they were thrown into the form of questions, the prisoner either
admitting or denying or explaining what was alleged against him.” See. James Stephen: A
History of the Criminal Law of England. Vol. I. London, 1883, Macmillan and C, p. 325. The right to
silence therefore is a product of the adversary criminal procedure conducted with the involvement
of counsel, Langbein claims. See Langbein, Historical Origins, p. 1047.
12 In criminal cases, therefore, in addition to the accused also the victim is entitled to this right.
In fact, it is even applicable to other types of procedures.
13 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908).
14 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 (1964). According to this ruling, the privilege against
self-incrimination – guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment – is binding for the states as well via the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.
15 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
their interrogation. By today the contents of this warning have become part
of everyday knowledge.16
As concerns continental Europe the right to silence had of course no place
in the medieval inquisitorial process. Here the accused was the object of the
proceedings and in a system of formal proof her confession was the “queen of
evidence” whose extortion justified torture. In the age of Enlightenment, the
idea that it is inhuman for anyone to be the cause of their own demise through
self-incrimination arose in parallel to the demand for the abolition of torture.
At the same time, the abolition of torture did not imply that the accused
was recognized as an autonomous subject of the proceeding and from among
the evidentiary means her confession retained its pre-eminent status. In order
to obtain her statement and make her tell the truth, sanctions on
disobedience or lying were extensively applied. In the continental mixed
system that was generally adopted in the 19th century, the accused may
neither be compelled to make a statement nor is she burdened by the
obligation to tell the truth, but her statement is still an autonomous evidence
of great probative value. In order to obtain a statement, continental law even
tolerates lies: it generally does not mandate the obligation to tell the truth,
and even if the accused is under such an obligation, a violation carries no
sanction in criminal law.17 In the same vein, the pre-eminence of the
accused’s testimony explains why numerous European procedural laws do
not mandate that the accused must be informed that she has the right to
refuse a statement and that a failure of the authorities to inform the suspect
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16 Based on the Miranda model, the Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. XIX of 1998;
hereinafter: CPP) provides that “before examining an accused she has to be informed that she is
not obliged to testify.” The accused also has to be warned that she may “at any time during the
examination refuse to give testimony or to answer individual questions.” See CCP Article 117 (2).
The CCP included the prohibition on compelling self-incrimination among the fundamental
provisions. According to Article 8 “no one may be compelled to provide testimony that
incriminates her or to provide evidence against herself.” For a summary of the Hungarian debates
on the warning concerning the right to remain silent see Tamás Földesi: A „Janus arcú titok” A titok
titka. [The “Janus-faced Secret”. The Secret of the Secret] Budapest, 2005, Gondolat, pp. 122–124,
and Mihály Tóth: A magyar Miranda elsõ néhány éve. [The First Years of the Hungarian Miranda]
In: Erdei Árpád (ed.): Tények és kilátások. Tanulmányok Király Tibor 75. születésnapjára. [Facts and
Prospects. Studies in the Honor of Tibor Király’s 75th Birthday] Budapest, 1995, Közgazdasági és
Jogi Kiadó, pp. 67–68 (Hereinafter: Tóth, Miranda).
17 According to Norwegian law “an accused is under no duty to make a statement, but if he
chooses to make one, he must tell the truth, if he can do so without exposing himself or his
family to the danger of punishment or the loss of the respect of his fellow citizens.” At the
same time, there is no criminal law sanction for perjury. See Jeffrey K. Walker: A Comparative
Discussion of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination. New York Law Journal of International and
Comparative Law, vol. 14, 1993, pp. 24–25 (Hereinafter: Walker, Self-Incrimination).
of her right not to speak, even if stipulated by law, does not always imply that
the contents of the statement have to be excluded from the scope of
evidence.18
The right to silence has been recognized in numerous international human
rights conventions – and in fact even in treaties dealing with different
subjects – created in the second half of the 20th century. It is explicitly
mentioned in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(hereinafter: Covenant/ICCPR)19 and – among the regional human rights
conventions – in the American Convention on Human Rights. The right to
silence is also listed in the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court,20
as well as the Geneva Conventions21 on the protection of victims of war.
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18 Walker, Self-Incrimination, pp. 20–28.
19 According to Article 14 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
adopted by the XXI. session of the General Assembly on 16th December 1966, “in the
determination of any criminal charge against him” everyone is entitled “not to be compelled to
testify against himself or to confess guilt.” According to the American Convention on Human
Rights, “during the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the (…) the right not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty (…). A confession of guilt by the
accused shall be valid only if it is made without coercion of any kind.” [Article 8 (2) g) and (3)]
20 According to Article 67 (1) g), the accused is entitled “not to be compelled to testify or to confess
guilt and to remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt
or innocence.”
21 The 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of victims of war. According to Article 17
of the Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War: “Every
prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first
names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this,
equivalent information. (…) No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion,
may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.
Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.” A similar proviso is contained in
Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War: “No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in
particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.” The provisions of the
Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 are similar to those of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The provisions of the laws of war guaranteeing the right to silence are derived from the
general principle according to which persons captured by the enemy cannot be compelled to
provide direct assistance to the party they are at war with. In addition to the right of silence,
another rule deriving from this principle refers to the prohibition of compelling captured
persons to undertake activities that are connected to military operations against their own
country. See Michael S. Green: The Privilege’s Last Stand: The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Right to Rebel Against the State. Brooklyn Law Review, vol. 65,
Autumn 1999, pp. 706–707 (Hereinafter: Green, Self-Incrimination).
The right to silence is thus a widely recognized procedural guarantee.
Nonetheless ever since its inception it has also been mired in skepticism and the
debates surrounding it are not limited to questions regarding the right’s scope
and limits. Even since Bentham, according to whom “innocence claims the right
of speaking as guilt invokes the privilege of silence”,22 many have questioned the
legitimacy of the right to remain silent. The prevailing view of the American
scholars is that the right to silence is devoid of a reasonable justification and is
merely kept alive by public opinion and the practice of the administration of
justice.23 Beginning in the last third of the previous century, legislatures in the
countries adhering to the Anglo-American procedural order – dictatorships and
democracies alike – undertook measures to motivate defendants to speak. The
United Kingdom followed the example of Singapore, first in the Criminal
Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order of 198824 and then in the 1994 Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act25 when it authorized judicial decision-makers to
draw adverse conclusions from the defendant’s choice to remain silent.26 In
Australia it was judicial practice, and not the legislature, which in the early 90s
tightened the scope of the right to remain silent.27
The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order of 1988 was drafted in the
hope that it would help uncover and hold accountable the perpetrators of
terrorist acts.28 In the United Kingdom there is a tradition of constricting the
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22 Jeremy Bentham’s Treatise on Judicial Evidence (London, 1825, J.W. Paget) is usually noted as a
source. For the debate surrounding the source see Ian H. Dennis: Rectitude Rights and Legitimacy:
Reassessing and Reforming the Privilege Against Self-incrimination in English Law. Israel Law
Review, vol. 31, no. 1–3, 1997, pp. 24–25 (Hereinafter: Dennis, Self-Incrimination).
23 Green, Self-Incrimination, pp. 628–629.
24 Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988.
25 The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
26 For a discussion of the Order and the Act see Eileen Skinnider – Frances Gordon: The Right to
Silence – International Norms and Domestic Realities. Available at. http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/
Reports/Silence-BeijingfinalOct.15.PDF (Hereinafter: Skinnider – Gordon, International Norms). On the
prehistory and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Act of 1994 see Gregory W. O’Reilly:
England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice. Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 85, Autumn 1994, pp. 423–427.
27 Skinnider – Gordon, International Norms, p. 15.
28 According to the provisions of the Order, the court may draw inferences (that is adverse
conclusions) from the fact that in the course of the investigation the suspect fails to account for
suspicious objects or marks found on her or in her possession at the time of arrest, or does not
explain why she was found at or near the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Adverse
inferences may also be drawn from the fact that in the preparatory phase of the proceeding or
during the trial the accused has refused to testify, or if at the trial she refers to circumstances in her
own defense which she had failed to mention during the investigation, even though it would have
been reasonable to expect that she invoke these circumstances already before the police.
right to silence in the interest of scaling back crimes against the state. The Irish
law which authorizes the government to enact a decree by proclamation on the
curtailment of the right to silence dates back to 1939. Any person arrested for
any crime falling within the scope of this law may be called upon by the police to
extensively account for where she was and what she was doing at a specific time;
she may further be instructed to provide any information she might have on
crimes falling under the scope of the law, which were committed or being
planned by other persons. Refusing the statement or providing false information
qualifies as a criminal offence punishable by up to six months imprisonment.29
The threat of international terrorism has strengthened those voices calling
for a further curtailment of the right to silence.30 The most radical – and thus
far widely rejected – proposal was submitted by Alan Dershowitz, professor at
Harvard Law School: in the case of persons suspected of being involved in
terrorist acts, he suggested that the use of “moderate” torture is worth
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29 This is the law on the basis of which the authorities proceeded in the Heaneys and McGuiness
case, which resulted in a finding of violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights [Heaney and McGuiness v. Ireland 34720/97 (21/12/2000), Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 2000–XII]. The law also declares membership in an unlawful organization a crime and
provides that if the government finds that given the domestic situation, the ordinary courts are
incapable of carrying out their tasks, it may set up special tribunals adjudicating indictments
brought on charges of criminal acts against the state. For a detailed presentation of the law see par.
19–25 of the judgment.
30 As regards the responses given to terrorism, we can observe two tendencies: on the one hand
the guarantees in substantive and procedural criminal law are relaxed, and on the other hand
the administration of justice – considered to be of low efficacy – is exchanged with
instruments that are deemed more efficient. Turning to military instruments or alien law
regulations holds the promise of better results than criminal proceedings that are seen as
complicated and which, through the safeguards – especially the stringent evidentiary rules
burdening the state – often result in an acquittal of guilty persons. There is a significant
difference between states in how far these alternative instruments have relegated criminal law
into the background: in the Anglo-American countries – maybe because their criminal
procedure has retained a greater portion of the rules concerning a formal evidentiary system
and because their system of safeguards is more refined than the average – there appears to be
a greater temptation to avenge acts of terror with methods other than the administration of
criminal justice. In continental Europe – at least the way I see it – criminal law has not yet
completely lost its credibility. To give only one example, in an event held in 2004, the attorney
general of the Swiss Federation argued in favor of using the instruments of criminal law, while
voicing his concern that in many places the “war paradigm” was gaining ground ever more
forcefully and uninhibitedly. He thought that criminal law, based on the principle of
individually identified personal responsibility would better serve to strike a balance between
liberty and security than the instruments deployed under the slogan of the “war on terror.”
(Source: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 June 2004) The full text of the presentation given by the attorney
general on 15 June 2004 is available at: http//www.ba.admin.ch/deutsch/2_bundesanwalt/ pdfs/
d-Ref-0400615_BA_IHRF_Luzern_pdf.
consideration.31 The time is therefore sadly appropriate to assess the value of
the right to silence and what its worth is, what it entails and what its limits
are. Given the weight of the issues involved, I devote a separate chapter to
this discussion. In the following, I will examine these issues in light of the
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: the Convention) and
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: the
Court/ECtHR). But – as I have done in previous parts of this study – I will
also refer to other sources and will assess the relevant provisions of
Hungarian procedural law in light of my conclusions.
2. The relationship between the right to silence
and the other rights secured by the Convention
In contrast to the Covenant the Convention does not mention the right to
silence.32 Article 14 of the Covenant, states that “in the determination of any
criminal charge against” her everyone has the right not to be compelled to
make a statement against herself or to confess her guilt. The Covenant’s
provision enshrines the Roman law postulate of nemo debet prodere se ipsum –
that is no one may be compelled to provide evidence against herself nor may
anyone be forced to contribute to her own conviction.
It is surprising that the Convention is silent on the issue of the “right to
silence”, especially considering that Article 6 was drafted in the spirit of
Anglo-American procedural law and that the privilege against self-
incrimination is generally associated with the Anglo-American accusatorial
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31 Alan M. Dershowitz: Why Terrorism Works. Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge.
New Haven-London, 2002, Yale University Press, pp. 131–163. For the sake of completeness
I should note that Dershowitz only finds the compulsion to provide a statement – and the
resultant use of torture in case of a refusal – defensible if the individual has been assured that
she will not be held criminally liable.
32 From the fact that it makes no mention of this right among the components of a fair trial, the
European Court of Justice (hereinafter: ECJ) concluded that the Convention does not regard
this privilege as one of the elements of the right to a fair trial. See Case 374/87, Orkem v.
Commission (1989) ECR, 3350–3351. In support of its position, the Luxembourg Court, in addition
to the text of the Convention, also referred to the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights. The ECJ held that it is a general principle of community law that the Commission may not
compel anyone to admit a violation of law the burden of proof for which lies with the Commission.
The ECJ reiterated this position in the Otto v. Postbank case, emphasizing that the privilege against
self-incrimination applies to criminal cases or proceedings on the grounds of conduct that is
subject to administrative sanctions. See Case C-60/92, (1993) ECR, 5711-5712.
procedure. Still, over the last few years many experts have cast doubt on the
widely held notion in Anglo-American literature that the principle of nemo tenetur
in England derives its existence from the fact that common law triumphed
over the inquisitorial procedure employed by the Star Chamber and the High
Commission.33 The debates surrounding the historical roots have no bearing
on the fact, however, that the type of procedural order in which the privilege
against self-discrimination fits without causing inner contradictions is the one
in which as a principal rule the accused is not regarded as a source of
evidence – and the Anglo-American model is of this kind.
It is also surprising that the privilege against self-incrimination was not
included among the rights listed in Protocol No. 7 of the Convention
adopted in 1984, even though the drafting of the protocol was deemed
necessary precisely to ensure that the safeguards provided by the Convention
be brought to an identical standard as those enshrined in the Covenant.34
Reviewing the rights laid down in the Convention, one might get the
impression that the drafters of the Protocol simply thought it superfluous to
include the privilege against self-incrimination among the enumerated rights
because they were of the opinion that the values the privilege is intended to
protect are sufficiently safeguarded by the other rights. If the rights enshrined
in the Convention are respected, the right to silence will be enforced even
without being specifically mentioned.
One of the functions of the privilege is to ensure the physical and
psychological integrity of the defendant and to preclude her intimidation or
torture.35 It is undeniable that the prohibition of torture, inhuman and
degrading treatment36 offers only limited protection in that they address only
the most brutal forms of coercion. In this regard the right to respect for
private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention offers a more extensive
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33 Langbein shows that as long as the accused was not genuinely provided with a defense by counsel,
she had no other choice but to confront the accusation, that is to speak. Silence would have implied
waiving one’s defense entirely. See Langbein, Historical Origins, p. 1047.
34 Stefan Trechsel: Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings. Oxford, 2005, Oxford University Press, p.
361 (Hereinafter: Trechsel, Criminal Proceedings). Trechsel still considers it fortunate that the
privilege against self-incrimination has not been added to the provisions of the Protocol. Had this
right been included in the Protocol, then the Commission and the Court could not have taken the
position that even though Article 6 does not specifically mention it, the privilege is an implicit
component right of a fair trial. As a result, the privilege would not have been binding for those
states that have not ratified Protocol No. 7.
35 Walker, Self-Incrimination, pp. 1–37.
36 Article 3 of the Convention.
protection. In the literature and in judicial practice the privilege against
self-incrimination is often derived from the right to have one’s privacy
respected. According to the argument, the right to silence signifies the
recognition of the existence of a private sphere, which in turn is the
precondition of preserving personal identity and autonomy.37 Coercing
individuals to reveal their secrets and to share their personal knowledge and
impressions conflicts with respect for privacy.38
The right to silence may also be construed as a manifestation of the
freedom of expression.39 This was the position taken by the European
Commission of Human Rights before the Court recognized the right to
silence as a component of the right to a fair trial. In the K. case the
Commission40 found a violation of the Convention because the Austrian
court had ordered an “insubordination” arrest (Beugehaft) in order to coerce a
statement from the applicant, who had formally been examined as a witness
but was de facto a suspect in the case. The Commission found a breach of
Article 10 of the Convention by arguing that the freedom of expression does
not only apply to communicating freely and to ensuring the free conveyance
and dissemination of information and opinion, but also to withholding them.
The freedom of expression, as a negative right, thus implies the right to
silence.41
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37 D.J. Galligan: The Right to Silence Reconsidered. Current Legal Problems, vol. 41, 1988, p. 69.
Cited in: Dennis, Self-Incrimination, pp. 41–42.
38 Andrew Ashworth: Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure. London, 2002, Sweet &
Maxwell, p. 20 (Hereinafter: Ashworth, Serious Crime).
39 The historical roots of the prohibition on compelling self-incrimination also point to a
relationship between the nemo tenetur principle and the freedom of conscience and expression. The
Puritans and Catholics charged by the High Commission referred to the postulate of ordinary law
(ius commune) when they refused to take the oath that was meant to compel them to reveal their
conviction. The principle of nemo tenetur detegere turpitudinem suam (no one may be compelled to
reveal her shame) recognized in ius commune did not provide a general right to silence, but offered
protection to the accused from having to provide the grounds for the proceedings herself, by
making public her views and convictions. See Alschuler, Privilege, p. 2640. On the origins of the
right to silence also see Helmholz, Origins, pp. 962–990; and Langbein, Historical Origins.
40 Prior to the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 the Commission examined the case first. It
was considered by the Court only after the Commission delivered its decision.
41 Report of the Commission in the case of K. v. Austria 16002/90 (13/10/1992). The case did not
reach the Court because the applicant and the Austrian government agreed on a friendly
settlement. The Commission examined whether the rights of the applicant guaranteed by the
Convention were breached when he refused to testify as a witness in a criminal proceeding initiated
against drug dealers and, as a result, was first fined and then deprived of liberty. K.’s reluctance to
testify was explained by the fact that he, too, was facing a proceeding because he had purchased
drugs from the same dealers who were the suspects in the parallel criminal case. By providing an
But the right to a private life and the freedom of expression are also
guaranteed by the Covenant, as well as the American Convention among the
regional human rights documents.42 Despite this, both documents
specifically mention the privilege against self-incrimination among the
procedural safeguards. This fact only makes sense if the scope of the right to
respect for private life and the right to withhold information – which are
equally applicable in both criminal procedure and beyond – and the privilege
against self-incrimination, which is meant to provide protection for criminal
defendants, do not overlap. This is indeed the case and thus it is no
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incriminatory testimony against the dealers, K. would have provided evidence against himself as
well, which is why he opted for refusing to testify. In his application K. claimed that the Austrian
authorities had violated his rights guaranteed in both Articles 6 and 10. The Commission began its
examination of the application with the allegation concerning a breach of Article 10 and concluded
that freedom of expression was a positive and negative right at the same time. In the event of both,
the dissemination of information and withholding it, the right may only be limited if it happens for
a legitimate reason recognized by the Convention, in accordance with domestic law and meeting
the requirements of the necessity and proportionality test. In the case at hand, the Commission
decided that the restriction went beyond the degree necessary in a democratic society. Hence it held
that Article 10 had been violated and, pointing to this holding added that there was no further need
to examine whether Article 6 had been violated as well. It is open to doubt whether the
Commission made the right decision when it refrained from examining whether Article 6 had been
violated. The reason may have been that formally K. only appeared as a witness in the case against
the drug dealers, while Article 6 concerns the rights of those charged with a criminal offence.
Hence the Commission did not have to elaborate on the concept of “accused”. In my view there
would have been no hindrance to the Commission stating – following the example of the
autonomous interpretation of the concept of “criminal charges” – that though K. was formally to
be examined as a witness, given that in the criminal proceeding against him at the same time he was
“substantially” in the position of an accused as well (especially since his case could have been
adjudicated in the same proceeding that was initiated against the dealers, that is the separation of
the cases was not compulsory). Later, in the Serves case, the Commission abandoned its previous
position: it found a violation of Article 6, even though the applicant in the case had been examined
by a French court in a hearing in which he was not formally the accused. See Serves v. France
20225/92 (20/10/1997), Reports 1997–VI. The close relationship between the right to silence, the
right to respect for private life and the freedom of expression is also supported by the fact that the
applicants, in claiming that they had been compelled to incriminate themselves, also claimed a
breach of Articles 8 and 10, in addition to Article 6. See the K., Heaney and McGuiness as well as Serves
cases cited above.
42 During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum
guarantees: g) the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty
[Article 8 (2) g)]. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is made without
coercion of any kind [Article 8 (3)]. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution also guarantees
the freedom of expression and the Fourth Amendment touches upon the right to private life, in as
far it provides protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, but nevertheless the Fifth
Amendment still makes specific mention of the privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S.
Supreme Court has emphasized in several decisions that the protection laid down in the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments do not coincide. See Fisher v. U.S. 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976).
coincidence that over time the Court has recognized the right to silence as an
implicit component of the right to a fair trial.
The right to private life as well as the freedom of expression (and both the
negative and positive aspect of the latter) are qualified rights. The
Convention itself declares that limiting these rights does not constitute a
human rights violation, assuming that the restriction is prescribed by national
law and is based on a legitimate aim that is recognized in the Convention, and
that the restriction passes the necessity and proportionality tests.43
As I pointed out in Chapter I, in certain situations an individual may be
entirely deprived of qualified rights without this constituting a human rights
violation. Those who are banned from distributing their pornographic or
racist writings are clearly deprived of their freedom of expression in the given
situation, but they can nonetheless not claim to be victims of human rights
violations. In contrast to the above, the right to a fair trial and its component
rights are “unqualified rights”. In the case of these rights a total deprivation
cannot be compatible with the Convention: there is no interest or right in
whose name a person may be completely deprived of her right to a fair trial.
There is no situation in which the right to a fair trial would have to cede
ground to some other right or interest without a violation of human rights
occurring. The reason is that the right to a fair trial is composed of numerous
component rights whose exact content is not specified, and as previously
mentioned the Strasbourg Court assesses proceedings in their entirety.44
Limiting certain component rights does not necessarily render the whole
proceeding unfair, as the restriction may be compensated by other elements
to such a degree that the overall proceeding retains its fair character. But just
as there is no situation in which an unfair proceeding would be acceptable, no
trial can be compatible with the Convention in which the accused is entirely
deprived – in the name of some other right or interest – of a component of the
right of a fair trial.
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43 The U.S. Supreme Court, in its analysis of the differences between the safeguards offered by
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, explains: “If the Fifth Amendment protected generally
against the obtaining of private information from a man’s mouth or pen or house, its
protection would presumably not be lifted by probable cause and a warrant or by immunity.
The privacy invasion is not mitigated by immunity; and the Fifth Amendment’s strictures,
unlike the Fourth’s are not removed by showing reasonableness.” See Fisher v. U.S. 425 U.S.
391, 400 (1976).
44 In addition to the explicit and implicit component rights other factors, too, may be relevant in
adjudging the quality of the proceeding. Such a factor may be the severity of the sentence
imposed.
The right to private life and the freedom of expression may be limited in
the interest of preventing and prosecuting crime,45 assuming, among others,
that the interference meets the requirements of proportionality. In assessing
proportionality, the gravity of the criminal offence the defendant is suspected
of is also considered. In the previously cited K. case the Commission deemed
the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression disproportionate
because – among other reasons – the authorities wanted to coerce the
applicant into incriminating himself in the interest of revealing a relatively
insignificant aspect of the criminal case.46
The norms which make up the right to a fair trial, however, need to be
applied uniformly, regardless of the gravity or nature of the criminal offence
that is the object of the proceeding. It was precisely in its judgment
recognizing the right to silence as part of the right to a fair trial that the Court
observed: “The special features of customs law cannot justify such an
infringement of the right of anyone »charged with a criminal offence«.”47 In
another case that also touched upon the right to silence the Commission
declared unequivocally: “The right of silence, to the extent that it may be
contained in the guarantees of Article 6 (…), must apply as equally to alleged
company fraudsters as to those accused of other types of fraud, rape, murder
or terrorist offences. Further, there can be no legitimate aim in depriving
someone of the guarantees necessary in securing a fair trial.”48
3. The right to silence in the Court’s jurisprudence
With its ruling in Funke49 in 1993 the Court elevated the right to silence to
one of the elements of the right to a fair trial. The decision was predictable,
not least because the Council of Europe’s Expert Commission on Human
Rights had already in 1973 taken the position that the privilege against
self-incrimination is an ineluctable component of a fair trial.50 The Court’s
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45 Both, Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention speak of “prevention of crime” as a legitimate aim
for restriction, but the case-law also includes law enforcement in this concept.
46 See par. 51 of the Commission’s Report in the case of K. v. Austria 16002/90 (13/10/1992).
47 Funke v. France 10828/84 (25/02/1993), A256–A, par. 44.
48 See par. 71 of the Commission’s report in the Saunders v. the United Kingdom 19187/91
(10/05/1994) case.
49 Funke v. France 10828/84 (25/02/1993), A256–A.
50 Rogall, Der Beschuldigte, pp. 114–115.
position was also unsurprising in that the right to silence is closely
intertwined with the presumption of innocence,51 which is expressly
mentioned in Article 6, as well as with the adversary nature of the trial, which
the Court had already previously ranked among the implied guarantees of a
fair trial.52 It is true that the adversary nature of the trial primarily ensures
that the accused has access to all such information as may impact the decision
of the judge, and may express her opinion about them.53 But a proceeding in
which one of the parties may be compelled to serve as a source of evidence is
not compatible with the notion of adversariness.
One element of the presumption of innocence laid down in Article 6 is
that the burden of proof lies with the accuser. This implies a recognition of
the accused’s right to passivity: the accuser has to provide the evidence and this
burden cannot be relegated to the accused. Thus if the accused cannot be
compelled to prove her innocence, she may obviously remain silent.
In the customs administration proceeding underlying the Funke judgment54 a
heavy fine was imposed on the applicant for his unwillingness to turn over
documents, receipts and vouchers that would presumably have provided proof of
his guilt.55 The judgment, which found France in violation of the Convention, took a
position on several issues. It expanded the scope of Article 6 to administrative
proceedings, which could result in criminal prosecution, if the applicant is
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51 In its laconic decision the Hungarian Constitutional Court with reference to the presumption
of innocence declared unconstitutional the provision within the decree on the foreign
exchange authority that mandated an obligation of co-operation to the customers and did not
allow them to refuse testimony. [Constitutional Court Decision no. 41/1991 (VII. 3.)]
52 For sources see Richard Clayton – Hugh Tomlinson: The Law of Human Rights. Oxford, 2000,
Oxford University Press, p. 647 (Hereinafter Clayton – Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights)
and Trechsel, Criminal Proceedings, p. 90.
53 Trechsel, Criminal Proceedings, p. 85.
54 According to the provisions of French law in force at the time of the case, the investigation
could result in the initiation of a criminal proceeding, which did not occur in the case of Funke,
however.
55 According to the French customs and exchange law, the authorities may – in addition to their
extensive inspection authorizations – initiate a wide range of coercive measures. They may
examine the foreign financial transactions of the investigated person, her affairs concluded
abroad, and, depending on the results, they may initiate criminal proceedings. They may
conduct searches and they can take interim measures in order to secure the assets of the
investigated party if they feel that the investigation may result in the initiating of a criminal
proceeding and that in the interest of enforcing potential criminal sanctions the limitation of
the individual’s property rights is justified. The person who is thus investigated is obliged to
co-operate: she needs to make the documents specified by the customs authorities available
and a refusal to comply may carry fines. If the individual is late in fulfilling this obligation, a
daily fine may be imposed, and in case of non-payment she may be committed to prison.
‘substantially affected’ by the criminal sanctions already at the administrative
procedure. The Court’s observation that the protection offered by the right
to a fair trial is unitary and cannot be dependent on the type or gravity of the
criminal offence was particularly significant.56 In the portions of the
judgment addressing the search of the applicant’s home by the customs
authorities, the Court provided guidelines for how the proportionality of the
interference with the individual’s private sphere could be ensured.57
Although the judgment conclusively settled the debate about whether the
right to silence is part of the right to a fair trial, the Court merely proclaimed
the right without specifying its content or its scope, or without introducing
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56 Funke v. France 10828/84 (25/02/1993), A256–A, par. 44. The Commission, however, noting the
specific nature of economic/financial investigations and related criminal offences, did not arrive at
the same conclusion. It started from the assumption that the objective of the investigations is to
protect the fundamental economic interests of the state, as well as to secure the success of the state’s
economic policy and its fiscal balance. Thus those falling under the jurisdiction of the state are obliged
to a certain measure of loyalty: they are obligated to turn over such evidence to the authorities as may
be relevant for the investigation. The Commission also noted that it is by no means unusual in a
member state of the Council of Europe for the tax authorities to compel the tax-payers to provide
information regarding their wealth, their income or financial transactions. According to the
Commission, the obligation to provide information does not serve the purpose of making law
enforcement easier, but is meant to assist the implementation of legislation in the given area.
Moreover, given that it only requires information periodically, the state’s generosity and its trust
vested in its citizens becomes apparent: as a result of this stricter measures need not be applied and
continuous inspections are not necessary. Finally, the Commission stated that the applicant had only
himself to blame for the losses he suffered: had he co-operated with the authorities, he could have
avoided the sanctions. (See par. 64 and 65 of the Commission’s report.) The Commission’s reasoning
is debatable on two grounds – and the Court did indeed reject these arguments. The first is the
postulate that there is a form of crime the fight against which could be considered a policy issue. This
implies that the margin of appreciation of the legislature is extensive in this area and that the
administration of justice may apply instruments that are not generally permitted in a criminal
proceeding. The other problematic aspect of the Commission’s reasoning is how it seeks to justify the
obligation to co-operate. This in effect deprives the nemo tenetur principle of its essence.
57 The Court established a violation of Article 8 because it was of the opinion that the search and
seizure conducted by the customs authorities did not meet the proportionality requirement.
In support of this position, it noted that Article 8 (2) regarding the interference with the right
to a respect for private life needs to be construed narrowly. The Court acknowledged that the
complexity of the banking system and financial channels, and the immense scope of
international investments, make interference (including house searches), necessary, but it
added that appropriate and efficient guarantees are necessary to ensure that the interference is
compatible with the Convention. Such guarantees were not in place in the Funke case. They
were absent primarily because the authority granted to the customs organs was too broad: these
organs had exclusive competence to decide whether an investigation was necessary, as well as to set
the time and scope of the investigation. Their decision was not subject to judicial review. As the
legal conditions were too lax and had too many loopholes, the interference was disproportionate as
compared to the legitimate interest (preventing criminal offences or the well-being of the domestic
economy). See Funke v. France 10828/84 (25/02/1993), A256–A, par. 56–57.
any argument for its justification. Nor did it provide an explanation as to why
this right prohibits the authorities from compelling an accused to turn over
documents. Critics of the judgment cited the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court which asserted that the privilege against self-incrimination is limited to
testimony and that the Constitution is not violated if the taxpayer is
compelled to turn over documents that may incriminate her.58
But the text of the Strasbourg Court judgment does not merely condemn
coercion to provide testimony or to turn over documents, but in fact it seems
to prohibit any form of compulsion. According to the Court, Article 6 (1)
was violated because the authorities attempted to coerce the applicant into
turning over incriminating evidence that they were “unable or unwilling to
procure themselves by some other means.”59 This formulation suggests that
the right to silence also guarantees that the accused may not be compelled to
provide fingerprints, breath or blood samples, or to stand in a police
line-up60 – in other words it raises obstacles to the prosecution of crime
which may completely paralyze the work of law enforcement officials.
Critics of the judgment also call attention to the fact that in as far as the
state cannot compel her citizens to provide documents, it will have to resort
to house searches and requisitions more often, that is to take measures that
continuously and brutally interfere with our private lives.61 The delegate of
the Commission also called the Court’s attention to this possibility: “What
other possibilities will a State have to control the capital flows? It could
completely close down the frontiers and anyone going abroad or coming
back from a visit abroad would be searched from head to toe to see whether
there is any evidence of bank statements or bank transactions or any cash
that they are carrying in one way or another. You could supervise all bank
transactions and all telecommunications in order to spot any fraudulent
activity.”62 Critics of the Funke judgment also point out that the decision
makes it impossible to uncover and prosecute economic/financial crimes
committed by legal persons or in the context of their operations.63 Moreover,
by extending the scope of Article 6 – and hence of the right to silence – to
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58 Bert Swart: The Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights in 1993. European Journal of
Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1994, No. 2, pp. 187–188.
59 Funke v. France 10828/84 (25/02/1993), A256–A, par. 44.
60 Andrew S. Butler: Funke v. France and the Right Against Self-Incrimination: a Critical Analysis.
Criminal Law Forum, 2000, vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 476–477 (Hereinafter: Butler, Funke).
61 Butler, Funke, p. 471.
62 The verbatim record of the hearings in the cases of Funke, Crémieux, Miailhe v. France on 21
September 1992 (Doc. 38721). Stefan Trechsel’s reasoning is cited in Butler, Funke, p. 472.
63 Butler, Funke, pp. 470–471.
preliminary investigations preceding formal criminal proceedings, it also
prevents rational decriminalization.64
The Court answered some of the issues it had left open in the Funke
judgment in the context of the Saunders case.65 The British Department of
Trade and Industry had ordered an investigation prior to opening criminal
proceedings against the applicant. In the course of the investigation, the
applicant was compelled to make statements and to answer questions put to
him. Had he refused to provide answers, he could have been held liable for a
criminal offence.66 During the criminal trial, the prosecutor widely referred to
the statements made by the applicant during the investigation and the court
used them when assessing the credibility of the statements Saunders made at
the hearing.67
In its decision, which found the United Kingdom in violation of the
Convention, the Court reiterated that the privilege against self-incrimination
is a generally recognized international requirement which constitutes an
essential element of a fair trial as enshrined in Article 6, and it is furthermore
also closely intertwined with the presumption of innocence. At the same time
the principle – in accordance with the way it is interpreted in some
Contracting States to the Convention and elsewhere – does not refer to
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64 Butler, Funke, p. 474.
65 Saunders v. the United Kingdom [GC] 19187/91 (17/12/1996), Reports 1996–VI.
66 During the investigation the affected person is obliged to co-operate: she needs to appear
before the investigators, must produce the requested documents and testify under oath.
A violation of this obligation may be punished by the court as if she had committed contempt
of court and thus she may be sentenced to up to two years imprisonment.
67 The British government argued – among other things – along the lines formulated by the
Commission in the Funke case: it claimed that the “right to silence” is not absolute and it also referred
to the particularities of the case, as well as to the special status and responsibilities of persons directing
corporations. The Commission, however, first made clear that even though the Convention does not
explicitly mention it, the “right to silence” – according to the Funke judgment – is a conceptual
component of a fair trial as laid down in Article 6. The applicant was not allowed to exercise this right,
however. If he had refused to answer the questions put to him by inspectors of the Department of
Trade and Industry, or if he had failed to produce the requested documents, he would have been subject
to criminal sanctions. And since the incriminating evidence in the criminal proceeding mostly stemmed
from the self-incriminating testimony and documents submitted during the earlier examinations, in
reality the applicant had no choice but to act as his own witness – “silence” was not a realistic alternative,
which is why the applicant’s right to defense was breached. The Commission – in response to the
Court’s judgment rendered in the Funke case – was forced to abandon its earlier position and thus
rebuffed the Government’s arguments, stating that it was unacceptable that different categories of
accused are entitled to varying degrees of a fair trial. The right to silence must be accorded to the same
degree to someone who is suspected of having committed commercial fraud, as it is to someone who is
accused of ordinary fraud, rape, murder or a terrorist act.
evidence that is obtained from the accused by coercion but whose existence
is independent of the will of the accused, such as for instance documents
seized during house searches, breath, blood or urine samples, as well as tissue
samples taken in the course of a DNA examination.68 Yet despite all the
above, the judgment only answered some of the criticisms voiced in relation
to the Funke judgment and still failed to respond to the question of what the
exemption precisely refers to.
The judgment sometimes refers to the privilege against self-incrimination,
sometimes to the right to silence, but generally it mentions the two together.
This suggests that the Court believes the scope of these two rights overlap:
“The right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are generally
recognized international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a
fair procedure under Article 6. Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection
of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities thereby
contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfillment
of the aims of Article 6.”69
Judge Martens, who attached a dissenting opinion to the Court’s decision,
draws a distinction between the prohibition on coercing self-incrimination
(or the exemption therefrom) and the right to silence. According to him the
two rights are in a general-specific relationship to one another. The privilege
against self-incrimination implies the right to refuse co-operation. As far as
its scope is concerned, the question is in how far the accused can be
compelled to co-operate in any way with the authorities and to thereby
provide evidence against herself, or to aid the process of obtaining evidence
against herself. Further questions relate to the sanctions that may be applied
for a refusal to co-operate, namely to what degree may the person refusing
co-operation be compelled to accept that the authorities obtain the
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68 Saunders v. the United Kingdom [GC] 19187/91 (17/12/1996), Reports 1996–VI, par. 69.
69 Par. 68 of the Court’s judgment cited par. 45 of the Murray judgment – which was delivered
earlier and will be discussed here later. [John Murray v. the United Kingdom [GC] 18731/91
(25/01/1996), Reports 1996–I] From the text of the judgment we can deduce that the content of
the two rights coincides. At most, they differ insofar as the right to silence, in addition to containing
the privilege against self-incrimination, also implies the requirement – which is also mandated by
the presumption of innocence – that the accuser has to provide evidence. See Michael O’Boyle:
Freedom from Self-Incrimination and the Right to Silence: a Pandora’s Box? In: Paul Mahoney –
Franz Matscher – Herbert Petzold – Luzius Wildhaber (eds.): Protecting Human Rights: The European
Perspective. Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal/Protection des droits de l’homme: la perspective européenne: mélanges
a la mémoire de Rolv Ryssdal. Köln-Berlin-Bonn-München, 2000, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, p. 1023
(Hereinafter: O’Boyle, Self-Incrimination).
incriminating evidence against her will? The right to silence – as it is
understood in the everyday interpretation – gives a person the right to refuse
to answer. The privilege against self-incrimination is a broader right that
implies the right to silence.70 The latter refers to the refusal of a certain form
of co-operation: it offers protection against being compelled to provide a
self-incriminating testimony.71 Later I will show that the two rights should
indeed be kept distinct, but I will also show that the two – due to the
divergence in their respective functions – are also qualitatively different. First,
however, I will undertake an analysis of the ECtHR’s relevant case-law,
which as will be seen is often marred by inconsistency.
The previously cited findings of the Saunders judgment suggest that the
Court identifies the privilege against self-incrimination with the right to
silence. The privilege against self-incrimination – we read in the judgment –
“is primarily concerned (…) with respecting the will of an accused person to
remain silent.”72 Alternatively, the privilege does not refer “to the use in
criminal proceedings of material which may be obtained from the accused
through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence
independent of the will of the suspect.”73
The Court does not limit the privilege against self-incrimination to
statements admitting violations of law or directly incriminating the person in
question: “Testimony obtained under compulsion which appears on its face
to be of a non-incriminating nature – such as exculpatory remarks or mere
information on questions of fact – may later be deployed in criminal
proceedings in support of the prosecution case, for example to contradict or
cast doubt upon other statements of the accused or evidence given by him
during the trial or to otherwise undermine his credibility.”74 This broad
understanding of the prohibition on compelling self-incrimination also
appears to show that the privilege is limited to ensuring the voluntary nature
of testimony.
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70 Judge Martens also cites the Murray judgment. See par. 4 of his dissenting opinion.
71 In Trechsel’s view the right to silence refers to acoustic communication, but the right obviously also
safeguards against coercion to provide written testimony. See Trechsel, Criminal Proceedings, p.
342.
72 Saunders v. the United Kingdom [GC] 19187/91 (17/12/1996), Reports 1996–VI, par. 69.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid, par. 71.
II.
THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE
1. The pre-eminent protection of defendants’ testimonies
My cautious formulation above was no coincidence. The text of the Saunders
judgment leaves open the possibility that the privilege may also refer to
something beyond the right to withhold testimony. After all, the privilege
does not exclusively, but only “primarily” mean that the defendant is free to
remain silent. This formulation does not rule out that there may be
something else that has no “existence independent of the will of the
defendant” and which may therefore not be obtained by coercion. I will
return to this question at a later point, but first I will seek to explore the
justification for the pre-eminent protection afforded to the voluntary nature
of testimony. The key question here is why does the privilege primarily mean
that one must “respect the will of an accused person to remain silent”?75
The distinction drawn by the Court, according to which testimony has no
independent existence as opposed to a urine or breath sample, for instance,
does not in itself provide an explanation. Let us put aside our doubts as to
whether a writing sample or a breath sample, which are designed to assess the
influence of alcohol, really exist apart from the will of the accused.76 Even if
we were to accept that the testimony of the accused is the only evidence that
is truly inseparable from her will, it would not justify the pre-eminent
protection for the freedom to testify. It does not explain why coercing a
statement is prohibited, whereas intrusion into the private sphere through
house searches for the sake of obtaining incriminating documents is
unproblematic and coercion in the interest of taking a blood or tissue sample
is allowed.77 After all, the authorities proceed against the will of the accused
in all these instances.
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75 Ibid, par. 69.
76 In his dissent, Judge Martens mentions as further examples the pin code or the password needed to
access information technology systems. See par. 12 of his dissenting opinion. American legal practice
unhesitatingly excludes the compulsion to provide a writing sample from the privilege against
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, since the coerced and potentially incriminating
sample contains nothing “testimonial”. See Fisher v. U.S. 425 US 391, 411 (1976). In the Delalic case, the
ICTY on the other hand qualified the compulsion to provide a handwriting sample as conflicting with
the nemo tenetur principle. (Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic also known as “Pavo”, Hazim Delic, Esad
Landzo also known as “Zenga”, Case No: IT-96–21–T, Trial Chamber, 16/111998, par. 66.)
77 Ashworth, Serious Crime, p. 19.
The theories invoked to justify the differentiated treatment – hence those
which trace the prohibition on coercing a statement back to the respect for
the private sphere or for individual autonomy – do not provide a satisfactory
explanation for the special status of the freedom to testify.78 In continental
procedural law, which tolerates, although does not encourage, lying – that is
it does not oblige the defendant to tell truth – the theory of “hard choices”
does not provide an answer either. According to this theory, the defendant,
in the absence of the right to silence, would be faced with a choice that is
antithetical to the requirement of basic fairness: either she contributes to her
own conviction by submitting a statement or she refuses to testify – or
alternatively testifies falsely – and is punished as a result thereof.79
The pre-eminent status of the exemption from testifying could
undoubtedly also be explained by historical reasons: in numerous decisions
the U.S. Supreme Court notes that without rules guaranteeing that the
accused’s testimony is voluntary, the administration of justice would
inevitably sink to the level of the inquisitorial process, which it regards as
barbaric. “[A]ny system of administration which permits the prosecution to
trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself
suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such
evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of the other
sources. (…) The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a
readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture.”80
The goal of obtaining information or extorting a confession is one of the
definitional elements of torture in the United Nations’ Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
as well.81 But the prohibition of coercion in the interest of obtaining a
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78 Dennis, Self-Incrimination, p. 43; Ashworth, Serious Crime, p. 20.
79 Green believes that the “cruel trilemma” argument only holds if we consider the criminal sanction
itself as cruel: “(I)f punishment for wrongdoing is not cruel, how can it be that compelling the
truthful testimony leading to such punishment is cruel?” See Green, Self-Incrimination, p. 631.
80 Wigmore’s thoughts are cited in Justice Goldberg’s opinion in Escobedo. Escobedo v. Illinois 378 U.S. 478
(1964).
81 According to Article 1 of the Convention: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term
‘torture’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.”
statement does not extend only to acts that inflict pain which is sufficient to
establish the use of torture, degrading or inhuman treatment.82
Other theories trace the pre-eminent status of the freedom to testify to the
differing probative value of evidentiary instruments obtained by compulsion.
Objective evidence which has an independent existence cannot be
manipulated by the accused: the credibility of a blood sample – its probative
value – is not affected by the means of its obtainment, whether it was
obtained with or without coercion.83 A testimony, however, can be either
true or false. The limitation of the right to silence to testimonies is thus based
on the desire for determining the facts of the case truthfully. The right to
silence also contributes to a disclosure of the truth by attributing greater
probative value to the testimony of innocents. If an obligation to testify were
mandated, then the courts – precisely because of how easily testimonies are
manipulated – would attribute low credibility to testimonies made by the
accused. Since the veritably guilty generally opt for refusing to testify, the
credibility of the innocents’ testimony appreciates if the right to remain silent
is recognized.84
The force of this game theory explanation is limited, however: it could only
account for the pre-eminent status of free testimony in the Anglo-American
system. In other words, in a system in which the accused – if she chooses to
testify – is obliged to tell the truth85 and in which she is subject to ruthless
cross-examination in the course of which her criminal record may also be
revealed. All these factors may indeed motivate the accused to remain silent,
but these incentives are absent in the continental procedural model. Yet even
in the Anglo-American procedural system the explanatory value of this
theory is dubious, since it rests on empirically unverified assumptions. It
assumes that those who are willing to testify on their own behalf will tell the
truth and that the truly innocent accused – despite the depressing atmosphere
287
RIGHT TO SILENCE
82 Just as compulsion for the sake of gathering material evidence may cause pain and suffering
that qualifies as inhuman or degrading. This is presumably why the 1984 Police and Criminal
Evidence Act in the United Kingdom do not permit drawing so-called intimate bodily
samples (sperm, blood, urine, saliva, pubic hair, etc.) without the consent of the accused. At the
same time, the court may draw adverse conclusions from the accused’s refusal and this may be
interpreted as a corroboration of other evidence of guilt. See Butler, Funke, p. 477.
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not the case in continental procedural laws.
of a police interrogation room and despite the prosecutor’s harsh cross-
examination – is capable of submitting testimony that will persuade the
adjudicator of her innocence. The practice, however, shows that there are
hardly ever criminal proceedings launched against an accused-witness who is
caught lying, which suggests that fear of the consequence of perjury hardly
motivates the telling of the truth. In the decisions of the American Supreme
Court, the right to silence is justified – among other things – precisely with
the argument that the compulsion to testify will nudge weak and uneducated
innocent defendants to provide groundless confessions, and that the
“victims” of cross-examination are in fact often those non-guilty individuals
who are merely bad witnesses in their own defense.86 From the above I
conclude that even though the pre-eminent status of the accused’s testimony
may be justified on epistemological grounds (this is what I will attempt to
show below), it is not true that the right to silence indeed raises the probative
value of the testimonies made by innocent defendants and thus can be
considered as a guarantee of fact-finding accuracy.
As to their relationship to cognition – as I showed in the previous chapters –
we can distinguish three groups of procedural norms. The expressed or at least
primary function of rules in the first group is precisely to help the decision-maker
establish the facts of the case in correspondence with reality. The legitimacy of
these norms stems from their capability to assist in realizing the objective of the
criminal proceeding: namely they contribute to the disclosure of truth.
The norms belonging to the second group are not justified on such
instrumental grounds. They are meant to protect autonomous values
regardless of whether they help or even hinder the disclosure of truth.
Finally, I grouped into the third category the so-called fairness norms – the
right to silence among them – whose particular quality is that even though
they do affect fact-finding in the criminal process, they are not intended to
help determining the truth in general, but rather projected onto a previously
undertaken evaluation. Their function is to minimize the chance of wrongful
conviction, at the price that on occasion the guilty will evade punishment.
This last function is most clearly embodied in the presumption of
innocence, which is closely intertwined with the right to silence: the rule
derived from the presumption provides that when doubt regarding guilt
remains, the decision must be in favor of the defendant. In this way the rule
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serves to eliminate the possibility of wrongful convictions, at the price that
the guilty sometimes also escape justice. The presumption of innocence,
therefore, does not generally guarantee the accuracy of findings in a trial.
(The other fairness guarantees, such as, the right to defense, the rights to be
informed of the charges or to examine witnesses also primarily serve to
prevent the punishment of innocents and are not principally safeguards aimed
at ensuring that the court arrives at the truth.)
“The privilege, while sometimes »a shelter to the guilty«, is often »a
protection to the innocent«” – the U.S. Supreme Court claims.87 If it is true
that the privilege primarily serves to prevent wrongful convictions, its
applicability must obviously be limited to testimonies. If compulsion were
permitted in order to obtain a testimony, then there would be a real danger
that innocent persons would be convicted. In the case of compelling
someone to hand over evidence that exists independently of the will of the
accused, or when compelling someone to endure the search or other means
aimed at obtaining such evidence, this risk is low. Prohibiting coerced
testimonies hence reduces the probability of convicting innocents. This is
also proclaimed in the phrase of the Saunders judgment cited above, which
asserts that the rationale for the right to silence and the right not to
incriminate oneself lies “in the protection of the accused against improper
compulsion by the authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of
miscarriages of justice.”88 There is, therefore, a powerful argument in support
of the pre-eminent status of the voluntary nature of testimony: this is an
important way of preventing innocent people from being punished.
But let us cite another sentence in the Saunders judgment as well: the
privilege “does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material
which may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory
powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect
such as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood
and urine samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing.”89 In
the context of documents, this phrase only refers to the obligation to tolerate
compulsion. This means that an individual may not invoke the right to silence if
documents that support her guilt are obtained against her will through some
form of coercion, for example during a house search. It follows from this
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formulation, however, that the right to silence not only prohibits compelling
testimony, but also forbids the authorities to oblige – on the pain of
sanctions – the accused herself to turn over documents which might incriminate
her in proceedings already underway or in proceedings to be initiated at later
stage which would be based precisely on the evidence so obtained.90
The Court did not, therefore, overrule the holdings of the Funke judgment,
a fact further supported by the judgment delivered in the J.B. case.91 Here the
Court found that the Swiss government had violated the right to silence: the
applicant was involved in an administrative proceeding initiated on the
grounds of a presumed tax evasion and was fined because he had refused to
turn over documents which could have incriminated him.
To thus extend the scope of the right to silence would be contrary to the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, on which the Strasbourg
Court relied to a significant degree in its decisions. The Supreme Court only
recognizes the scope of the privilege enshrined in the Fifth Amendment in
the instances of testimonial communication: utterances in which statements
are explicitly or implicitly presented or information is revealed.92 The
communication is of a testimonial type – and may hence not be compelled –
if the individual reveals the contents of her thoughts, divulges information or
confesses her guilt. This is why the privilege laid down in the Fifth
Amendment does not apply if the individual is compelled “to furnish a blood
sample, to provide a handwriting exemplar, or a voice exemplar; to stand in a
line-up, and to wear particular clothing.”93 Similarly, documents of any kind
or their incriminating content do not fall in the category of testimonial
communication.94
The rationale underlying the Court’s limiting of the scope of the right to
silence – namely that the right only authorizes the withholding of something
that has no independent existence apart from the will of the individual in
question – does not justify the extension of this right to the turning over of
documents, as official documents and receipts do exist – in as far as they exist
– regardless of the will of the accused. Similarly, the arguments I raised in
favor of the pre-eminent status of the freedom to testify are not valid in the
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case of refusing to turn over documents. It would be absurd to claim that the
probability of wrongful convictions increases if the accused is compelled to
turn over incriminating documents in her possession.
But then what justifies extending the right to silence to refusing to turn
over such documents? Why may the individual not be compelled to turn over
documents herself? Moreover why is the right to silence not violated if the
police or officials of the tax authority obtain such documents by ransacking
the affected person’s home or even by potentially violating her physical
integrity in a body search? Neither the Saunders, nor the J.B. decisions answer
these questions and in the latter judgment the Court merely notes that in the
case of documents whose submission was refused by the applicant, the issue
at hand did not concern material “which has an existence independent of the
person concerned.” However, the Court failed to provide any kind of
explanation for this statement.
O’Boyle rightly asserts that there are undoubtedly situations in which the
compulsion to produce some documents is, in effect, identical to a
confession by testimony. If someone is accused of membership in an illegal
organization and is being called upon to surrender her membership card to
the authorities, then she essentially confesses to a criminal offence by
complying with the request.95 In the Funke case it would have been equivalent
to a confession if the applicant had handed over documents confirming his
foreign bank transactions, since he lacked permission to undertake these
transactions and without the requisite permission a criminal offence is
committed. Yet this does not imply that the document – be it a membership
card or a receipt confirming foreign deposits – loses its autonomous
existence. The J.B. decision suggests that the Court does not limit the
privilege against self-incrimination to documents whose delivery would be
tantamount to a confession. Although a blood or breath sample could also be
“an evidence identical to a confession”, according to the Court the right to
silence is not affected if it is obtained by compulsion, or even force, from the
person in question. In summary, the specifics of the given document’s
content are not sufficient for justifying the Court’s decision.
The Court’s position could, however, be supported by the argument that
compelling an accused to “betray” herself is a graver violation of the values
underlying the right to silence – the respect for human dignity, the
individual’s instinct of self-preservation and her autonomy – than a situation
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in which the evidence of guilt is coercively taken, without leaving the accused
with a choice in the matter. In as far as this line of reasoning holds, it is not a
violation of the right to silence if the authorities obtain incriminating
documents by interfering with the right to a private sphere or to physical
integrity through a house or body search respectively. There is also no choice
involved if a blood or tissue sample is coercively obtained from the
defendant: the individual cannot reproach herself for causing her own demise
and the right to silence is not violated in this case either. The Court, however,
does not justify the distinction by referring to differing degrees of violations
of human dignity or autonomy. In fact, the Court provides no explicit reason
for making the distinction at all.
But if we organize the assertions made in the Funke and J.B. judgments, we
can indeed find an answer to the question of why the right to silence is
implicated by the compulsion to produce documents or by the application of
sanctions for refusing to do so in some cases, when in other situations, in
which direct coercion is used to obtain documents or other evidence, the
same right is not effected? In Funke the Court asserted that the officials of the
customs authority wanted to gain access to documents whose existence they
were uncertain of, but which they presumed to be extant. As they were
incapable or unwilling to obtain the documents in another manner, they
compelled the applicant to turn over the evidence which could potentially
prove his guilt.96 In the J.B. case the Swiss government defended itself by
arguing that – in contrast with the facts in Funke – the authorities were aware
that the applicant was making investments which he could only have
sustained with income that was concealed from the tax authority.97 The
government argued that “the applicant had not been obliged to incriminate
himself, since the authorities were in fact already aware of the information in
question.” The Court was not persuaded by this argument. The government,
we read in the judgment, did not dispel doubts that the authorities wanted to
obtain the incriminating documents from the applicant himself, especially “in
view of the persistence with which the domestic tax authorities attempted to
achieve their aim. Thus, between 1987 and 1990 the authorities found it
necessary to request the applicant on eight separate occasions to submit the
information concerned and, when he refused to do so, they successively
imposed altogether four disciplinary fines on him.”98
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Compelling the handing over of documents thus violated the right not to
incriminate oneself because the method employed by the authorities sought
to obtain evidence of which they were unaware or of whose existence they
only had a very vague notion. In such cases it is indeed the individual in
question who produces the incriminating evidence, which constitutes a
violation of the principle of nemo tenetur seipsum prodere as it was originally
construed. Here the individual is forced to betray herself and is compelled to
be the cause of her own demise. The privilege against self-incrimination is
not violated, however, if based on sources other than the investigated person
herself the authorities deem the existence of the incriminating evidence
probable and, against the will of the individual, either by violating the sanctity
of the home or the right to physical integrity, obtain these documents
through a search of the individual’s body or house. When, therefore, the
Court limits the privilege against self-incrimination to “materials” existing
“independently” of the will of the accused, it uses the concept in a peculiar
manner which is different from its everyday meaning.
The “material”, the object or document, either exists or it does not. Its
physical existence does not depend on whether the authorities are aware or
have some notion of its existence. In the Court’s interpretation, however, the
document has no separate existence from the will of the accused unless the
authorities can establish its existence with evidence other than that which
derives from the active co-operation of the investigated person. In other
words, it is from the perspective of the authorities that the “material” has no
“existence independent of the will” of the accused. This interpretation can
also be applied to the testimony. The only reason this is not obvious is that
by definition the defendant’s testimony is an account of the event of the
criminal offence and its circumstances, submitted to the authorities in the
course of an inquiry. If I go into the field and shout my sins into the sky – no
matter how loudly and in what detail I do so – I am not giving testimony and
I do not make a confession. Similarly, if I write down the details of the crime
I committed either for posterity or as a reminder to myself, I only produce a
confession in the everyday sense of the word, but not in terms of procedural
law. The fact that my testimony exists in a written form does not entitle the
authorities to compel me to speak against my will.
But the testimony – by virtue of the concept itself – truly has no existence
independently of the accused’s will. At the same time it is disingenuous to
make the independent existence of the documents contingent upon whether
the authorities are aware of them or not. The document does exist, regardless
of whether the authorities know of it. But even such a questionable
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interpretation of the concept of “materials” existing independently from the
will of the accused cannot justify an identical assessment of compulsion
directed at coercing testimony and that aimed at the submission of
documents.99 This is what I wish to show below.
According to the principles formulated in the Saunders judgment, therefore,
the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to evidence “obtained
from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an
existence independent of the will of the suspect.”100 As an example of this
kind of evidence, the judgment mentions documents seized during a house
search.101 According to the above, a document has an “independent
existence” if its existence is at least assumed to be probable by the authorities.
There would be an obvious contradiction, however, if the Court were to ban
compulsion in the case of refusal to turn over documents that “have no
independent existence”, but were at the same time to permit – through
ransacking the investigated person’s home – the obtainment of incriminating
evidence whose existence the authorities were entirely unaware of. Hence a
house search cannot be compatible with the Convention either, unless the
authorities can show the requisite minimum evidence in support of their
belief in the existence of the object or document sought and that it can
presumably be found in the individual’s home. The Court is of the same
opinion: it found a house search in such a case to be incompatible with the
respect for private sphere. The case-law does not prescribe that the
authorities indicate in detail in the search warrant the objects or documents
they wish to obtain, nor does it prohibit the use of evidence that was
obtained “accidentally”: evidence which the authorities got hold of without
being aware of its existence beforehand. It does require, however, that the
coercive measures be reasonably substantiated, and this in turn necessitates
that the authorities have cause to believe that the specific objects and
documents do exist and that they can only obtain them by interfering with
the rights of the individual in question.
Strasbourg’s control is naturally limited when it comes to assessing
whether a given house or body search was reasonable or not. However the
assessment can extend to an examination of whether domestic law contains
such guarantees as are necessary to ensure that an interference with the
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individual’s private life only occurs on the basis of reasonable grounds for
suspicion (reasonable indicia) and that it is executed only to a justifiable
degree. Such guarantees can include, for instance, a clear specification of
house search criteria or the designation of its authorization into the
competence of a judicial body. In Funke the Court found a violation of
Article 8 because “the customs authorities had very wide powers; in
particular, they had exclusive competence to assess the expediency, number,
length and scale of inspections. Above all, in the absence of any requirement
of a judicial warrant the restrictions and conditions provided for in law,
which were emphasized by the Government (…), appear too lax and full of
loopholes for the interferences with the applicant’s rights to have been
strictly proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”102
If the authorities conduct the house search with the aim of finding
incriminating documents whose existence is not supported by some minimal
evidence, then – in line with the above – they seek to obtain evidence that has
no existence independent of the defendant’s will. Without at least some
substantiating prima facie evidence a house search or coercion applied for a
failure to hand over documents both violate the Convention.103 The
prohibition on compulsion is justified by the same interest in both cases: to
rule out groundless interference with the individuals’ life and to ensure
respect for their private sphere.
In summary, we can conclude that the values that justify the right to silence
on the one hand, and the prohibition on compelling the handing over of
documents that do “not exist independently of the will” of the accused on
the other, coincide only partially. The basis for both is the desire for having
one’s human dignity and private sphere respected. These are substantive
values whose recognition, as I have shown, is not justified by their potential
to enhance fact-finding accuracy (in fact they rather encumber the disclosure
of truth), or reduce the probability of wrongful convictions. Besides the
substantive values, the prohibition of using compulsion in order to obtain a
confession is also justified by the value that legitimates fairness rights: namely
it reduces the chances that a person will be punished who is, in reality,
innocent.
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What would have been compatible with the principles derived from earlier
judgments was for the Court to handle the right to silence separately from the
other instances of the privilege against self-incrimination. We saw that it is
only the former which reduces the risk of wrongful convictions and is hence
an element of procedural fairness. If we limit the right to silence, we violate the
right of the accused guaranteed by Article 6 (1). In the other instances
pertaining to the privilege – the coerced obtainment of documents among
them – it is the right to a private life enshrined in Article 8 that may be
violated. Had the Court been mindful of this, then it could have avoided the
justified criticisms. It would not have classified documents as evidence that
does not exist independently from the will of the accused, a notion that
requires a rather far-fetched and artificial justification. Moreover, had the
Court followed this path, I do not consider it impossible that it would have
arrived at a different result in the Funke104 and J.B. cases.
A separate treatment of the right to silence and the other manifestations of
the privilege would have helped to answer some of the fundamental
questions raised by the Funke and Saunders cases. For example, is it acceptable
that the contents of human rights and the corresponding level of protection
they provide are established differently depending on the particularities of the
criminal offence that is the object of the proceeding? Do we find a certain
degree of compulsion that we classified as a human rights violation in one
context justifiable in another instance, for example with reference to the
exceptional gravity of the criminal offence in question or, on the contrary,
because the potential punishment that may be imposed is so mild, or because
proving the offence requires the use of specific measures?
From the analysis of the case-law above105 I concluded that a relaxation of
those procedural guarantees that are meant to avert the wrongful conviction
of innocents (to recall, these are the fairness rights as well as the requirements
vis-à-vis the courts) is not acceptable with reference to less serious nature of
the particular criminal offence or the relative mildness of the applicable
sanction.106 But neither can a deviation from the general standard of a fair
trial be justified on the grounds that the proceeding is conducted on the basis
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of the suspicion of an especially grievous crime. Finally, the pre-eminent
status of the right to a fair trial also does not allow for its scope to be
subordinated to considerations of expediency. A deviation from the general
standard can therefore not be justified by the nature of the criminal offence
in question. These are the tenets summarized and generalized by the Court in
its Saunders decision, which clearly states that it is unacceptable that different
groups of accused be afforded different levels of protection under Article 6.
This principle does not apply to the right to a private life, which is open to
limitation. As a qualified right, it may be limited in the name of other rights or
interests. Interference with the private sphere – among other things – is
acceptable if it serves one of the legitimate aims specified in the Convention,
and if the interference is both necessary and proportionate. In order to assess
necessity and proportionality, one must compare the degree of the limitation
with the value of the opposing right or interest. As I pointed out previously,
the gravity and type of the criminal offence, as well as the potential means of
protecting the interest that justifies the interference, are all relevant factors.
The coercion that is necessary for uncovering and prosecuting a particular
criminal offence may be unnecessary in another case when the same goal can
be reached without a restriction. An interference proportionate with the
interest in prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of grave criminal offences
may be disproportionate if the procedure is used for proving a less grievous
criminal offence.
The arguments expressed by the Commission in the Funke case, which are
truly indefensible in the context of Article 6, may be persuasive if we qualify
the compulsion employed by the authorities not as a restriction of the right to a
fair trial but as an interference with the right to respect for private life. To
recall, Funke was fined because he had refused to turn over documents and
receipts which the authorities believed would prove that he committed an
offence. The Commission refrained from finding a violation of Article 6
because – among other things – it thought that the specific nature of
economic/financial crimes may justify a deviation from the general level of
protection offered by the right to a fair trial. The fight against such crimes may
be regarded as a policy issue, the Commission argued, and hence the margin of
appreciation available to the domestic legislature is rather broad, which means
that the authorities can employ instruments that are otherwise inadmissible in
criminal proceedings. Invoking the implementation of the state’s economic
policy is really a poor argument when applied to Article 6. This is what
Commissioner Soyer demonstrated in his dissenting opinion, in which he
criticized the majority’s position. According to Soyer’s argument if in
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proceedings initiated on the grounds of customs or foreign exchange offences
economic interests can justify obliging the investigated person to co-operate,
then in reality any suspect can be compelled to supply evidence against himself.
This is so because we could claim for any crime that its prosecution ultimately
serves to enforce the state’s public safety policy and the success of this policy
requires that all citizens co-operate with the police.107
In as far as we regard the compulsion to produce receipts or other
documents as an interference with private life (I have already shown that this
is indeed the case), then the arguments of the Commission’s majority in
Funke are no longer absurd. In enumerating the legitimate aims for limiting
the right to respect for private life, Article 8 of the Convention makes special
mention of the country’s economic well-being, in addition to crime
prevention, which latter, based on the case-law, also includes the prosecution
of crimes. Implementing the state’s economic policy may thus justify an
intrusion into private life in the interest of uncovering financial crimes. In
itself this does not mean that restricting the right to a private sphere is
compatible with the Convention; for that to happen the interference needs to
withstand the necessity and proportionality tests. Let us recall once more
what Stefan Trechsel explained before the Court in the Commission’s name: if
in the interest of supervising capital flows the state would not be able to
compel an individual citizen to co-operate, then it would have no other
choice but to extend its control to everyone. It would have to conduct a full
body search on everyone crossing the borders, review all banking
transactions and tap all phone conversation in order to uncover fraudulent
operations: “Obviously this would be a totalitarian approach and would, of
course, work against the interests of citizens.”108
Among the reasons justifying an interference with private life, the
Convention also mentions the protection of the rights of others. Intruding
into the private sphere of a citizen who is under suspicion and compelling her
to turn over incriminating documents in her possession may qualify as
proportional if the alternative were for the state to permanently and intensely
limit the same right of every citizen instead.
I do not claim that in the Funke or J.B. cases the Court would have found
that the Convention had not been violated if it had classified the compulsion
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to turn over documents as an intrusion into the private sphere. But I do
assert that it erred when it qualified the compulsion used for this purpose as a
violation of the right to a fair trial, instead of examining the question in the
light of Article 8 of the Convention.
2. Limits to the right to silence
As opposed to the right to refuse the handing over of documents, the right to
withhold testimony is indeed part and parcel of the right to a fair trial and
within this an implicit component of procedural fairness. We already noted
above that the right to a fair trial is an unqualified right as are the component
rights in the sense that the accused may not be entirely deprived of them with a
reference to other rights or interests. But according to the ECtHR the right to
silence does not apply in an unlimited manner either.109 This position is not
surprising given that in the case of implicit rights, such as the right to silence, it
is the Court itself that designates the scope and limits of these rights.
The right to silence can only fulfill its functions if its exercise does not
incur disproportional costs. At first glance this statement may appear striking:
how could exercising one’s right involve costs? I will return to this question
at the end of this chapter. The fact is that numerous legal systems allow
courts to draw adverse inferences from the defendant’s exercise of her right
to silence. This is morally most disconcerting in legal systems in which the
accused is explicitly reminded that she has the right to remain silent.110 It is
no coincidence that in the United States the accused’s silence may not be
specifically commented on by the prosecutor or the judge in a manner that
could influence the jury’s verdict to the detriment of the accused.111
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, it does not raise any problems,
however, if the prosecutor attacks the credibility of an accused who chose to
remain silent prior to the trial phase of the proceeding and then decides to
speak at the hearing as witness for the defense. In this case, the prosecutor
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may point out that if everything that the accused raises in her defense were
true, she could obviously have mentioned it earlier.112
In the United Kingdom, however, the abovementioned Northern Ireland
Order (1988) and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) authorize
the trier of fact to draw “proper inferences” from the accused’s silence. The
1988 order provided the basis for the Strasbourg application that gave the
Court the opportunity to clarify whether the right to silence is absolute and, if
not, then what degree of indirect compulsion may be justified in the interest
of obtaining a testimony.113 In its decision rendered in the Murray case,114 the
Court reiterated the fundamental principle that the right to silence is a
cornerstone of a fair trial as it provides protection against unacceptable
compulsion.115 But this right is not absolute and it does not guarantee that
the courts will not consider the silence at all when assessing the evidence.
Whether Article 6 is breached depends on the circumstances of the specific
case, on the type and degree of compulsion used and also on how much
weight is accorded to the silence when assessing the evidence.116 In the
Murray case the Court – also with a view to the strength of the indirect
incriminating evidence presented by the prosecution – did not find a
violation of Article 6.
The Northern Ireland Order and the Act of 1994 triggered sharp criticisms
in the scholarly literature.117 O’Reilly flat out claimed that England has
stepped on the path towards adopting an inquisitorial type criminal
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112 Jenkins v. Anderson 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
113 In terms of drawing inferences from silence, the literature distinguishes the prohibition on
coercing self-incrimination and the right to silence in the following terms: while the first
inhibits direct coercion in the interest of obtaining a testimony or information, the latter precludes
indirect coercion. The right to silence therefore draws the boundary beyond which an accused’s
failure to speak may not justify drawing adverse conclusions regarding her guilt. See Ashworth,
Serious Crime, p. 18.
114 John Murray v. the United Kingdom [GC] 18731/91 (25/01/1996), Reports 1996–I.
115 Ibid, par. 45.
116 Ibid, par. 47. The Court finally concluded that the coercion did not reach a degree that would have
“destructed” the right to silence. Silence does not qualify as a criminal offence or as contempt of
court, and on the basis of judicial practice it cannot be regarded as an indication of guilt. The fact
that the applicant was warned that his silence vis-à-vis the police and the refusal to serve as a witness
may result in adverse inferences being drawn by the court may be regarded as indirect coercion, but
this is not enough to find a violation of Article 6. See par. 48–50 of the judgment.
117 See for example James Michael – Ben Emmerson: Current Topic: The Right to Silence.
European Human Rights Law Review, 1995, No.1, pp. 4–19.
procedure.118 He is right in so far as the inquisitorial trial invests greater
effort into making the accused talk than the accusatorial model. This also
applies to modern continental procedural laws, which are also closer to the
inquisitorial model. At the same time, provisions openly declaring the
possibility of drawing reasonable inferences from silence can be explained
with a particularity of the Anglo-American procedural model, namely that as
opposed to modern continental procedural laws it has preserved some
elements of the formal evidentiary system. This is what H. Danielus, the
representative of the Commission, alluded to in the proceeding before the
Court: “(T)he courts in a considerable number of countries where evidence is
freely assessed may have regard to all relevant circumstances, including the
manner in which the accused has behaved or has conducted his defence,
when evaluating the evidence in the case. It considers that, what distinguishes
the drawing of inferences under the Order is that, in addition to the existence
of the specific safeguards mentioned above, it constitutes, as described by the
Commission, »a formalised system which aims at allowing common-sense
implications to play an open role in the assessment of evidence«.119” Let me
add to all the above that it is not at all unusual in the Anglo-American model
to impose the persuasive or at least the evidential burden of proving certain
facts on the defense.120
In the continental system, it is in principle the prosecutor who has to prove
all elements of the criminal offence, the positive elements and the absence of
negative conditions alike. But, as Tibor Király writes, in such a trial, too, there
can be situations in which the accused has to waive the right to silence in
order to avoid conviction: “There can be (…) situations in which the grounds
for suspicion and the circumstantial evidence seem to amass so solidly that
breaking them apart is not possible without the co-operation of the accused.
[In such cases] the actual [as opposed to the legally mandated] evidentiary
burden falls on the accused.”121 In the situation described by Király, the
accuser has persuasively demonstrated the guilt of the accused. The issue is
not that the court needs to fill the missing link in the chain of incriminating
evidence by adding the accused’s silence to them. Commissioner Danielus, on
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118 Gregory W. O’Reilly: England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards an Inquisitorial
System of Justice. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1994 Fall, vol. 85, pp. 402–452.
119 John Murray v. the United Kingdom [GC] 18731/91 (25/01/1996), Reports 1996–I, par. 54.
120 Ashworth, Serious Crime, p. 256.
121 Tibor Király: Mit ér az ártatlanság vélelme? [What is the Presumption of Innocence Worth?]
Magyar Jog, 1987, No. 12, p. 1023.
the contrary, referred to this very situation: in countries accepting the system
of free proof the court may evaluate the silence of the accused as a piece of
incriminating evidence without whose assessment it could not completely
dispel its doubts concerning the guilt of the accused.
It is indisputable that continental procedural law attempts to make the
accused speak. To do so, it even tolerates her lying (even though lying is
morally justifiable in a considerably narrower range than silence122). It
promises milder punishment in return for repentance, but in the unitary trial
model, where no separate sentencing hearing is held after the conviction, the
accused can only hope for equitable treatment if she herself provides
evidence of her guilt.123 Once the accused has spoken, be it during the
investigation or in the course of the trial, the court is no longer restrained in
any way in assessing her testimony. All this inevitably follows from the nature
of the system of free proof. The principle of free evaluation of evidence
requires that the judge herself take a position on the probative value of the
evidence. She does so by comparing the respective credibility of the individual
evidentiary means.124 This method of determining the truth is expressly
formulated in a provision of the Hungarian CCP as follows: “The court (…)
freely evaluates the pieces of evidence separately and in their entirety
[emphasis added], and it establishes the results of the evidentiary procedure
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122 Kent Greenawalt: Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right. William and Mary Law Review, Fall
1981, vol. 23, p. 30 (Hereinafter: Greenawalt, Silence).
123 A confession is a substantial mitigating circumstance if an “accused who does not exercise her
right to refuse testimony thereby essentially contributes to determining the facts of the case.”
(BH 1992/5–291) Judicial practice also motivates the accused to make a confession that helps
uncover the crime by weighing a confession submitted during the investigation phase as a
substantial mitigating circumstance, even if the accused exercises her right to silence during
the trial but assents to having her previous confession read out. (BH 1993/8–480). Position
paper No. 154 of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division also emphasizes that “a confessional
testimony touching on the issue of guilt is a mitigating circumstance (…) and it has even
greater impact if it helps uncover the facts; in such an instance a confession extending to the
act as a whole has an extenuating effect even if the guilt is partially denied.” (BK 154, point 11)
The emphasis is therefore not on contrition or on confessing guilt, but rather on the accused’s
help – through her statement – in uncovering the crime she committed.
124 In systems of legally controlled proof formal rules of evidence serve to assist in determining
credibility. The value of individual evidentiary instruments is previously determined and it
does not need to be compared to others. In the Anglo-American system cross-examination is
meant to serve this purpose: the examiner seeks to show contradictions in the accused’s
statement and thus to cast doubt on the testimony itself, without having to show that the
accused’s statements are incompatible with other evidence. See Károly Bárd: A büntetõhatalom
megosztásának buktatói. [The Pitfalls in the Division of Criminal Authority] Budapest, 1987,
Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, pp. 161–162.
based on its conviction resulting therefrom.”125 The silence of the accused
not only deprives the court of a piece of evidence that can be separately
evaluated, but also of a point of reference that might help it to assess the
value of the other evidentiary instruments.126
Any rule which guarantees that the accused may exercise her right to
silence in any stage of the proceedings can lose a great deal of its practical
value once the accused has spoken given that her testimony may be read out
without restrictions. The intention is – among other things – to thereby
motivate her to speak again, not only to scrutinize her credibility but also
because her testimony helps the court evaluate the value of other evidence. If
she nevertheless chooses silence, then at least by reading out her prior
statement this becomes part of the trial materials, and can be evaluated and
compared with all the other evidence. It is conceivable that the objective
formulated at the beginning of drafting the new Hungarian criminal
procedure law, namely that the principles of directness and of the primacy of
the trial (as compared to the investigation) should figure more prominently in
the code, came to naught because the new law preserved the system of free
proof in undiminished scope. The provisions of the law that might have
bolstered the principle of directness are not effective because those applying
the law stick to the previously followed method for determining the truth.127
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125 CCP Article 78 (3).
126 Damaska writes: “It appears, then, that the continental system is not concerned about exposing the trier
of fact to the defendant’s unsworn testimony, although – considered as a class – it is of dubious
trustworthiness. It is believed that precious information can be obtained even from false denials of guilt,
detected inconsistencies, and other verbal or non-verbal expressions emanating from the defendant’s
person. All this information enters into the totality of data on the basis of which guilt-determination will
eventually be made.” Mirjan Damaska: Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 121, 1973, p. 528.
127 On the ideas concerning codification and on what portion of them ended up being realized, as well as on
the subsequent history of the 1998 CCP, see – among others – the writings of Péter Hack, Ákos Farkas,
Tibor Bodor, András Túri, László Láng and János Bánáti on the reform of criminal procedure law in the
“Fórum” column of the 2002/2 issue of the Fundamentum magazine (pp. 46–69), as well as the interviews
by Gergely Fahidi and Csaba Tordai with Tibor Király and Károly Bárd in the same issue (pp. 41–45);
furthermore Péter Hack: Az új eljárási törvény és az ügyészség alkotmányos helyzete. [The New
Procedural Law and the Constitutional Status of the Prosecutor’s Office] In: Ákos Farkas (ed.):
Emlékkönyv Kratochwill Ferenc (1933–1993) tiszteletére. [Memorial Volume Published in the Honor of
Ferenc Kratochwill] Miskolc, 2003, Bíbor Kiadó, pp. 143–160.; Péter Hack: A kihallgatás rendszere a
tárgyaláson. [The System of Examination in the Hearing] In: Mihály Tóth (ed.): Büntetõ eljárásjogi
olvasókönyv. [A Reader on Criminal Procedure Law] Budapest, 2003, Osiris Kiadó, pp. 353–356; Anna
Kiss – Renáta Kardos: Az ügyész szerepe a büntetõeljárásban. [The Role of the Prosecutor in Criminal
Procedure] In: Ferenc Irk (ed.): Kriminológiai Tanulmányok 40. [Studies in Criminology 40.] Budapest,
2003, Országos Kriminológiai Intézet, pp. 230–253; Tibor Király: Büntetõ eljárási jog. [Criminal Procedure
Law] Third revised edition, Budapest, 2003, Osiris Kiadó, pp. 89–95.
To recall, at the beginning of the codification process there was a
consensus among scholars and practicioners in Hungary that the trial should
be the primary arena for determining the truth, and that its function should
not be limited to reviewing the information gathered in the course of the
investigation. Thus there was also a consensus that the practice of
automatically reading out the investigation documents, including those
containing testimonies, had to be ended. The provision of the CCP that drew
a distinction between the reading out and the presentation of testimony
submitted as an accused or a as witness was also meant to advance this
objective. Testimony submitted by the defendant during the investigation
may only be read out if the accused does not wish to testify during the
hearing, if she failed to appear at the hearing in spite of being properly
summoned, or if she is at an unknown location and the proceeding may be
conducted in her absence.128 As opposed to this, the presentation of some parts
of the earlier testimony takes place if there is a contradiction between the
accused’s testimony at the trial and her earlier statement.129
Drawing a distinction between the reading out and the presentation of
testimony only makes sense if they have distinct consequences. The
legislative intent was for the read-out testimony to serve as a direct basis for
the judicial decision, while in the case of a presentation only the following
explanation or potential silence of the accused was to be used by the court.
However judicial practice has not followed this distinction. In practice the
difference between a reading out and a presentation is seen as a quantitative
one, with the former extending to the testimony as a whole, while the
presentation only to certain parts of it. Moreover, there are judges who even
today routinely read out the whole testimony submitted during the
investigation, even though the law clearly provides that “a presentation of
parts of the earlier testimony may only take place if the accused was asked
questions regarding facts and circumstances that are contained in the
presentation, or if the accused has testified during the trial with regard to
these facts and circumstances.” The law, furthermore, makes it the
responsibility of the presiding judge to ensure that the presentation does not
exceed what is necessary to establish the facts of the case.130
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128 CCP Article 291 (1).
129 Article 291 (4).
130 Article 291 (5). With this practice the judges followed the guidelines developed during the era of
the fCCP (Act no. 1 of 1973), which made it mandatory to read out the testimony submitted
during the investigation if there were differences between the statements made at the hearing and
during the investigation. Reading out is not optional, therefore, “and it cannot be replaced by a
presentation of the testimony provided during the investigation.” (BH 1990/7–251)
While judicial practice, therefore, runs counter to the intent of the
legislator and is often even contrary to the text of the law, it cannot be
criticized from a human rights standpoint. (The fact that a court does not
follow all the provisions of the procedural law does not in itself render the
trial “unfair”.) Reading out the accused’s earlier statement and using it in such
a way does not violate the right to silence if she had testified freely, without
coercion. It cannot be derived either from human dignity or from the right to
a fair trial that the accused herself be accorded the right to determine how her
voluntarily submitted testimony will be used during the trial. By remaining
silent during the trial or changing her earlier statement, the accused cannot
exclude such earlier testimony from the range of evaluated evidence.
The situation is different if the court wishes to read out a testimony the
accused made in an earlier phase of the proceedings as a witness. The original
text of the CCP left no doubt that reading out such testimony is only
acceptable if the accused herself files a motion to this effect.131 Since the
amendment of the CCP in 2002,132 the text of the law also allows for an
interpretation that such testimony can be read out at the trial practically
without limitation. (I will show later that such an interpretation is in fact
unacceptable.) According to the provision currently in force, “if the accused
is interrogated as a witness during the investigation, then the testimony may
only be read out if the accused so requests, or if it [emerges] from the
minutes of the witness testimony” that before the interrogation it was
clarified that there was no obstacle to interrogating her and, furthermore, she
was reminded of her obligation to tell the truth as well as of the
consequences of perjury. By employing a purely grammatical interpretation
of this provision, some courts have concluded that the accused’s previous
testimony – which she provided as a witness – may be read out against her
will, provided that the procedural safeguards regarding the examination of
witnesses had been observed. This latter condition, however, is not a real
limitation because it is not mindful of the transformation in the procedural
position of the individual in question. If the investigative authority fails to
inform the witness of her rights and privileges, or her duties, then her witness
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131 CPP Article 291 (1). From the wording it also emerged unequivocally that the accused may
only request the reading out of her previous witness statement if she wishes to exercise her
right to remain silent at the hearing. This makes sense, since if the accused wishes to speak;
she may repeat everything that is contained in her previous testimony, which would render its
reading out superfluous.
132 Article 173 of Act no. I of 2002.
testimony may not be used in any case.133 In other words, if we accept the
courts’ interpretation then the law says that the accused’s previously
submitted witness testimony may be read out if it is used according to the
general rules governing the use of witness testimony. This, however, is
self-evident and its repetition appears superfluous, unless the legislator
sought to make it clear thereby that while in the absence of a motion by the
accused only witness testimony submitted under regular circumstances may
be used, at the request of the accused even such testimony may be considered
which – since it was obtained through a violation of the Code’s provision –
would otherwise have to be excluded.134 Such an interpretation is not
altogether unreasonable, for example the accused may seek to bolster her
credibility by referring to testimony which she submitted without a proper
reminder of her privilege against self-incrimination. However, the probability
that the legislator wanted to allow for an exception to the general rule of
prohibiting the use of witness testimony made without a proper reminder is
rather low.
Although the current text of the law leaves no doubt that previous
testimony provided as a witness may only be evaluated if the accused does
not speak at the trial, some courts – failing to consider the previously
discussed distinction between reading out and presenting – confront the
accused with her previous testimony if it does not correspond to her
statements made during the trial.135 The courts believe that this practice is
justified on the grounds that the law obliges them to uncover all the facts of
the case.136
We can now consider whether it is a violation of human rights if the courts
use testimony previously provided by the accused as witness without her
consent. An aspiration to uncover the truth is not a ground for an exemption
from the obligation to respect human dignity and the requirements of a fair
trial. The privilege against self-incrimination, due to the accused and the
witness alike, can be traced back to human dignity and respect for privacy.
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133 See CCP Article 82 (2) and Article 78 (4).
134 It emerges from the text of Article 84 of the CCP that the testimony cannot be taken into
consideration if the witness was not properly warned.
135 See the report prepared by Ágnes Frech summing up the issues related to the interpretation of
some provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure discussed at the judges’ conference on
13 March 2006. Available at: http://www.fovarosi.birosag.hu/szellemimuhely/szellem.htm
136 According to the second phrase of Article 75 (1) of the CCP “the evidentiary procedure must
strive to establish the facts of the case as thoroughly and comprehensively as possible, in
accordance with reality.”
The values embodied in these rights (I referred to these values as substantive
values) are those which we feel are worth protecting in criminal proceeding as
well, even though our respect for them does not increase the chances of
accurate fact-finding. In fact, they are rather a hindrance to the trier in her
efforts to determine the facts of the case. In the institution of the exemption
from providing testimony, as in general when it comes to exclusionary rules,
we recognize these substantive values. Citing Beling again, exclusionary rules
in law obstruct a passable route, a route that would safely lead to the
destination, but of which we nevertheless think that it should not be treaded.
With regards to the accused’s right to silence we observed that it is one of
the components of procedural fairness. The function of the fairness norms is
not to generally aid the accurate determination of the facts, but rather to
provide a safeguard against wrongful convictions, even at the price that some
of the guilty will go unpunished.
An approach that allows for using the accused’s testimony that she
provided earlier as a witness without her consent has no regard for the
essential idea underlying the right to silence, according to which the accused
freely decides whether by speaking she will provide any information that may
be evaluated at a later point just as any other collected evidence.137 (If she
chooses to speak of her own volition, she no longer disposes of the fate of
her testimony; this is why her previously made statement as a suspect or an
accused may be used later, even if she chooses to exercise her right to silence
subsequently.) The witness, however, is not in a position to decide: she is
both obliged to speak and to tell the truth.138 Thus “it is not fair to hold an
accused who is not obliged to tell the truth accountable for previous
testimony, made while she was a witness under the duty to tell the truth.”139
But this is not only morally unfair, it is also legally unacceptable as it violates
the right to a fair trial.
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137 (Dem nemo-tenetur-Prinzip) „entsprechend ist das Aussageverhalten nur dann der prozessualen
Beweiswürdigung zugänglich, wenn der Beschuldigte seine Aussage in freier Willensbestimmung
zum Gegenstand jenes Entscheidungsfindungsprozesses machen will.” Tido Park: Die
prozessuale Verwertbarkeit verschiedener Formen der Beschuldigteneinlassung im
Strafverfahren. Strafverteidiger, 2001/10, p. 590 (Hereinafter: Park, Beschuldigteneinlassung).
138 Only the defendant chooses freely. It is no coincidence that the CCP – exactly in the interest of
allowing the defendant to decide freely, with an awareness of the potential consequences – only
mandates an obligatory warning in the case of the defendant: whatever she says may be used as
evidence [Article 117 (2)]. As far as witnesses are concerned, such warnings are superfluous: the
witness has no room for consideration because she has to testify.
139 Ágnes Frech: A büntetõeljáráson kívül beszerzett bizonyítékok felhasználása. [The Use of
Evidence Obtained outside the Criminal Proceeding] In: Gábor Halmai (ed.): Személyi szabadság
és tisztességes eljárás. [Personal Liberty and Fair Trial] Budapest, 1999, INDOK, p. 33.
The witness is obliged to speak: the compulsion does not cease and the
testimony does not become voluntary by virtue of the fact that she may
refuse to testify if as a result of speaking she were to charge herself with a
criminal offence.140 Invoking this privilege is obviously not without risks.
Ultimately it is up to the authorities to decide whether the privilege applies.
Hence the witness must decide whether to provide information that makes
the existence of grounds for refusal more probable (thereby indirectly
incriminating herself) or to expose herself to fines for groundlessly refusing
to testify, potentially even provoking a criminal proceeding against herself
(either for abetting a crime or for withholding information on extenuating
circumstances). But even if we put these concerns aside, it is still true that the
cited provision of the CCP does not eliminate compulsion. It only guarantees
the right to withhold incriminating information, but it does not allow for
refusing testimony.141 The witness is otherwise obliged to speak and we know
from the Saunders judgment that the right to silence is not limited to directly
incriminating statements or statements through which the defendant admits
to her guilt. “Testimony obtained under compulsion which appears on its
face to be of a non-incriminating nature – such as exculpatory remarks or
mere information on questions of fact – may later be deployed in criminal
proceedings in support of the prosecution’s case, for example to contradict
or cast doubt upon other statements of the accused or evidence given by him
during the trial or to otherwise undermine his credibility.”142
To reiterate, using testimony provided by the accused when she was a
witness (who was at that time under compulsion) violates the right to silence
unless she consents to its use. My claim is that through a systematic and
historical interpretation Article 291 of the CCP can be interpreted in a way
that is compatible with the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the
Convention and the Hungarian Constitution.
The former Code of Criminal Procedure had no provisions regarding the
use of testimony submitted prior to a change in the procedural position.
Judicial practice construed the silence of the law as implying that the accused’s
earlier testimony as a witness may not be read out in case she chooses to
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140 CCP Article 82 (1) b).
141 The German Code of Criminal Procedure also makes the difference apparent by
distinguishing the right to refuse incriminating answers – as a right to refuse information
(Auskunftsverweigerungsrecht) – from the right to refuse testimony (Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht). See StPO
Articles 52, 53, 53a and 55.
142 Saunders v. the United Kingdom [GC] 19187/91 (17/12/1996), Reports 1996–VI, par. 71.
remain silent at the trial, and that the accused may not be confronted with her
earlier witness testimony if its contents conflict with her statements made at the
trial.143 The original text of the 1998 CCP only authorized the use of
previously recorded witness testimony based on the accused’s own motion
(that is in her own interest). The 2002 amendment changed the original text,
but according to the explanatory note prepared by the Ministry of Justice all
that the amending act did was to coherently order the provisions regarding
the use of earlier testimony submitted by the accused, without effecting any
substantial changes as compared to the previous regulation. I know from
personal experience that those drafting the commentary occasionally
consciously choose to remain silent on some rules of the law which – given
their importance – they should have commented on. Nevertheless the
drafters of the commentary did not tend to lie, and if the drafters of Act no. I
of 2002 would have wanted to extend the use of testimony provided
previously as a witness to cases in which the accused did not make a motion
to this effect, then the commentary would have been untruthful in stating
that the previous regulation was not changed substantially.
In light of the above, the current provisions of the CCP allow for an
interpretation that is compatible with the Convention. The relevant text is as
follows:
Article 291 (1) If the accused does not wish to testify at the trial or in the
case of Article 281 (5), as well as in a situation in which the whereabouts of
the accused are unknown, her testimony submitted during the investigation
may be read out on the corresponding motion of the prosecutor, the accused
or her counsel or ex officio by the presiding judge or by the court reporter.
(2) If the accused was examined as a witness during the investigation, then
her testimony may only be read out if the accused makes a corresponding
motion or if it emerges from the minutes of the investigation that the
warning laid down in Article 85 (3) [on the privilege against self incrimination
and the witness’ duty to tell the truth] was unequivocally conveyed and
understood.
Article 291 (1) therefore allows a previously submitted testimony – either
in a capacity as suspect or as an accused – to be read out in two cases:
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143 Ágnes Frech: II. A vádlott és a tanú korábbi, esetleg más eljárásjogi pozícióban tett vallomásának felolvasására
és felhasználására vonatkozó szabályok. [Provisions Pertaining to the Reading out and Use of Previous
Testimonies Submitted as Accused or Witness or Any of Them in a Different Procedural Position]
Available at: http://www.fovarosi.birosag.hu/szellemimuhely/szellem.htm
a) if the accused exercised her right to remain silent (which naturally means
that she must be present)
b) if the accused is not present and the proceeding or parts thereof may be
conducted in her absence.
Paragraph 2 makes provisions concerning the reading out of testimony
submitted previously as a witness and it establishes the criteria for allowing
this to be handled differently based on the distinct situations described in
paragraph 1, without actually reiterating these situations. The first phrase
(reading out is allowed if the accused makes a corresponding motion) refers
to the situation described in point a), while the second (the testimony was
made and recorded in accordance with the provisions of the Code on witness
testimony) refers to situations described in point b), when the accused is not
present at the trial and is therefore obviously not in a position to motion for
her testimony to be read out.
If the accused is present at the hearing and testifies, then her previous
statement made as a witness may not be used under any circumstances. In
such cases only a presentation (and not a reading out) of the previous testimony
may take place in order to clarify contradictions, and Article 291 (4) expressly
limits such presentations to testimony submitted as suspect during the
investigation or as accused in an earlier phase of the trial.
3. The price of silence?
Based on everything I have written thus far it can be concluded that
continental law strives to make the accused speak, a fact that follows
necessarily from the logic of free proof. Thus if the accused even temporarily
or partially waives the right to silence then her testimony will be subject to
evaluation. In this case the courts may even lean towards evaluating the
partial silence as evidence substantiating the guilt of the accused. German
jurisprudence makes a distinction between so-called horizontal and vertical
silence in this regard. The former addresses a situation in which the
defendant – either during the investigation or the trial – makes statements in
the course of some interrogations while choosing to stay silent during others.
In such a situation no adverse inferences can be drawn from the accused’s
refusal to testify. If the defendant has grounds to be concerned that her
silence during the investigation will be interpreted to her detriment if she
chose to testify later, then she is in reality deprived of her choice: what else
could she do but to completely waive her right to silence from the beginning
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of the proceeding.144 Choice is similarly out of the question if the accused’s
subsequent silence would be interpreted negatively by the court: if in such a
scenario an accused were to speak at some point, she would no longer be able
to exercise her right to silence later.145
In the case of vertical silence the accused, in the course of the same
examination, makes statements only regarding some aspects of the case by
responding to only some of the questions raised while refusing to answer others.
According to German jurisprudence silence in such cases may be interpreted to
the detriment of the accused: “If the accused makes a statement in the
knowledge that she will not be compelled to do so later, she turns herself into an
evidentiary instrument out of her own volition, and thereby her statement, just as
other evidence, becomes a subject of free evaluation. The judge may not be
precluded from drawing inferences from the fact that an accused, who is
otherwise willing to make statements, leaves certain questions unanswered” –
says the judgment of the German Federal Supreme Court.146 The Federal
Court’s reasoning is subject to debate in the literature,147 but the procedure
described as unproblematic by the Bundesgerichtshof meets the requirements of
common sense. Thus it appears probable that in freely assessing the evidence,
the courts – regardless of whether they have an explicit authorization to do so or
not – will consider a refusal to answer certain questions as factors substantiating
the guilt of the accused.
Let me reiterate that continental law, though it recognizes the right of the
accused to remain silent, at the same time motivates her to speak. If the
accused even temporarily or partially waives the right to silence, then not only
her testimony, but in fact her silence, too, will become part of the court’s
consideration. But the free evaluation of evidence does not authorize the
courts to interpret silence as a circumstance substantiating guilt in all
situations, as Commissioner Danielus’ opinion in the Murray case suggests.
The Telfner judgment illustrates this point.148 In Telfner the Austrian courts
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144 BGHSt 20, 281; 38, 302 (305).
145 Park, Beschuldigteneinlassung, p. 591.
146 BGHSt 20, 298 (300).
147 According to the critics of this judicial practice, the structural situation of the defendant is
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choice if her silence results in adverse inferences regarding her guilt. Hence the two cases
ought to be treated in the same manner and the courts should be precluded from construing
the accused’s silence against her. See Park, Beschuldigteneinlassung, p. 591.
148 Telfner v. Austria 33501/96 (20/03/2001).
found that the applicant had caused an accident with his mother’s vehicle, as
a result of which the victim suffered slight injuries. Even though the injured
party could not identify the driver of the vehicle, the Austrian courts held
that it was in fact the applicant. Their conclusion was based on the fact that
the car was generally used by him, that he had spent the night of the accident
away from home, and that – apart from denying his guilt – he did not make a
statement. The Strasbourg Court found a breach of the presumption of
innocence because it was of the opinion that the Austrian courts had
construed the applicant’s silence as a factor substantiating his guilt, thereby
violating the rules deriving from the presumption of innocence: namely that
the burden of proof lies with the prosecution and that doubts need to be
considered in favor of the accused. The Court made clear that the judge may
indeed draw inferences from the accused’s silence in procedural systems
accepting free proof as well. But, in accordance with the Convention, she
may only do so if the evidence presented by the prosecutor is so persuasive
that common sense only allows one conclusion to be drawn from the silence,
namely that the accused has no answer to the case against her.
The Telfner judgment is instructive because it shows that while to limited
degree only, the Strasbourg Court does review the process whereby the
national courts arrive at a determination of guilt, and thus it also expresses its
views on the question of whether the conclusions thus derived are
substantially correct. Weighing evidence falls within the competence of
national fora, but the ECtHR – just as domestic appellate courts – reviews
the accurate application of the rules of logic. In the case at hand, the
Strasbourg Court found a violation of the Convention because the facts
established by the domestic courts (i.e. that the accused generally used the car,
that he had not slept at home during the night of the accident and that he
exercised his right to silence) did not allow for only one conclusion, namely
that the applicant had indeed committed the crime. The Court has no
authority to review the evidence, but it may check the accuracy of inferring
facts from facts. What enables the Court to ascertain whether a national court
proceeded according to the rules of logic is the obligation of the continental
judge to attach a reasoning to her judgment wherein she must account for the
thought process which led her to the conclusion that the accused is guilty.
What we have seen, therefore, is that in the jurisprudence of the Court the
right to silence is not absolute: its limitation may be justified, though only in a
narrow range. Whoever uses this right must be prepared to potentially pay a
price for doing so because her silence can be construed as evidence of her
guilt. But how can the exercise of a legitimate right carry a price? The other
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components of the right to a fair trial may also be limited to various degrees.
The right to confront witnesses is not an “absolute” right and the right to
consult with counsel may also have acceptable limits.149 But unlike in the case
of the right to silence, in these examples the issue is not that the accused
suffers disadvantages because she exercises her rights. And we saw previously
that not even a disobedient accused who refuses to fulfill her procedural
obligations may not be penalized with the loss of her fairness rights.150
It is possible, of course, that the ECtHR plainly made a bad decision in
Murray. But it is not the only court which believes that exercising the right to
silence may also incur disadvantages. This was the position taken by
Hungarian Constitutional Court as well in its decision on excluding
compensation for pre-trial detention or imprisonment.151
The body held that the provision of the criminal procedure law excluding
compensation if the defendant “tried to deceive the authority for the purpose
of preventing successful investigation, or had otherwise attributably given
ground to the suspicion of having committed the criminal offence” was
unconstitutional.152 It did not, however, consider the exclusion of
compensation for imprisonment suffered as a result of a final court decision
as an unconstitutional limitation of the right to defense “if the defendant had
withheld in the original procedure the facts (…) on which the judgment in
the retrial is based.”153 The right to silence is thus not absolute and it is not
per se unacceptable if the law also attaches negative consequences to its
exercise. This position is consonant with that of the U.S. Supreme Court,
which has stated that “the criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is
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149 See for example the Commission’s decision in Kurup v. Denmark. The Commission declared the
application inadmissible, even though the Danish court had prohibited the defense counsel from
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whose examination only his lawyer, but not he himself, was allowed to be present. Kurup v. Denmark
11219/84 (10/07/1985), D. R. 42, p. 287.
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contains provisions concerning it. According to Article 580 of the CCP individuals may claim
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to Article 581 convicts are entitled to compensation for imprisonment if the process initiated
upon an extraordinary remedy results in acquittal or the discontinuation of the process.
152 See Section 1 of the Decision and Section III.B. 3.2 of the opinion.
153 See Section 3 of the Decision and Section III.B. 4 of the opinion.
replete with situations requiring ‘the making of difficult judgments’ as to
which course to follow. Although a defendant may have a right, even of
constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the
Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to
choose.”154 “Not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and
not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.”155
True, the cited decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, just as
those of the U.S. Supreme Court, does not deal with the question of whether
the silence of the accused may be subject to evaluation and, if it indeed may
be, whether it could be construed as a fact substantiating the guilt of the
defendant. The Constitutional Court only took a position on the question of
whether someone may lose her right to compensation for pre-trial detention
or imprisonment if she even partially exercised her right to silence. The U.S.
Supreme Court, for its part, decided whether the privilege against
self-incrimination is violated if the law allows the judge to give a milder
punishment to someone confessing her guilt. But it is indisputable that both
bodies affirmed that the right to silence is not necessarily violated if its
exercise carries risks or potentially even disadvantages.
In the case of the other fairness rights we would find this idea inherently
unjustifiable. We believe that the exercise of these rights may not imply any
risks. It would be unacceptable for us if the accused had to consider, for
instance, whether to exercise her right to be informed of the charges, to
prepare for her defense or to make use of counsel, because if she were to
exercise these rights she would be incurring a risk. Why then do the Supreme
Court of the United States, the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the
European Court of Human Rights all believe that silence can carry risks and
that its exercise may indeed carry a price?
Undoubtedly, as far as its formal character is concerned the right to silence
differs from the other components of fairness. The latter are positive rights in
the sense that they enable action (or they create the preconditions thereof);
through their exercise the accused can shape the proceedings. By recognizing
these rights we treat the accused as a subject of the proceedings and hence we
respect her human dignity as well.
The right to silence, in contrast, is – in terms of its form – a negative right in
a dual sense. It gives a license to refuse co-operation and thereby it also
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impedes the authorities’ intervention and it also prohibits them from using
any coercion in the interest of obtaining testimony. This does not change the
fact, however, that through the right to silence, too, we recognize the
individual as someone who shapes the proceedings: we grant her a choice and
thereby respect her dignity. It is up to her to decide how she wants to
influence the proceedings, something she may do either by talking or by
remaining silent. Silence may be construed either as a permitted mode of
defense or even as a waiver of the right to defense.
Nevertheless, we find it morally indefensible if someone has to suffer
adverse consequences for exercising positive fairness rights. We agree that a
regulation is morally unbearable if on the one hand it provides incentives for
the accused to act and to shape the proceedings, or leaves it up to her
discretion whether to make use of such a possibility, but at the same time
holds out the prospect of potential disadvantages if she were indeed to
exercise these rights. But why is there no such consensus regarding the right
to silence?156 The fact that the accused is entitled to the other fairness rights in
her capacity as principal subject of the proceedings, while to the right to
silence also as a source of information for the court, does not provide an
explanation.
The function of all fairness rights – the right to silence among them – is
identical: they are meant to offer protection against the wrongful conviction
315
RIGHT TO SILENCE
156 The reason may lie in the different evaluation from a moral perspective of the purely positive
fairness rights and the right to silence. While the moral assessment of purely positive rights is
unequivocally positive, the right to silence is morally ambivalent. It would not occur to us to
condemn anyone who is under suspicion and sought to learn the charges against her, or for
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Ethically, it is exactly the other way round: we believe that silence is an adequate reaction when the
suspicions of the “accuser” appears to have no basis in fact. In such instances it is morally
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thicken, morals dictate that the person accused respond and raise something in her defense. I will
not examine the issue of how the rules of criminal procedure can diverge from everyday moral
norms. But in any case, the notion that something is amiss with the right to silence is also well
illustrated by the fact that many of its advocates also argue in its favor by noting that accused
individuals do not often exercise this right and, even if they do so, it does not substantially influence
the outcome of the case; in other words it does not reduce the success of the prosecution. See for
example Tóth, Miranda, pp. 69–70.
of innocents. Any difference in their assessment may perhaps stem from the
consideration that the right to silence and the other fairness rights fulfill this
function to varying degrees. While there is consensus that the positive fairness
rights veritably fulfill this function, there are some doubts in this context
regarding the right to silence. Those who argue in favor of restricting this
right invoke American studies which show that jurors assess silence as a
circumstance substantiating guilt, which is why a truly innocent accused is
better off if she opts to speak.157
But if it can indeed be proven that the right to silence increases the
probability of convicting innocents, then it should obviously be done away
with and be replaced with an obligation to speak – assuming that the
protection of innocents is really regarded as valuable. In this case the
protection of innocents would not be best served by the right to silence, but
on the contrary, through an obligation to testify. This is Bentham’s view:
innocence claims the right of speaking as guilt invokes the privilege of
silence.
Legislation and court practice, however, do not eliminate the right to
silence but “only” seek to relax it. They believe that by doing so fact-finding
accuracy can be enhanced and as a result fewer guilty individuals will evade
punishment. At the same time, the argument continues, it is also in the
interest of the innocent that the truth emerges. According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the right to silence diminishes rather than increases the
probability of determining the truth.158 “The basic purpose of a trial is the
determination of truth, and it is self-evident that to deny a lawyer’s help
through the technical intricacies of a criminal trial or to deny a full
opportunity to appeal a conviction because the accused is poor is to impede
that purpose and to infect a criminal proceeding with the clear danger of
convicting the innocent. (…) By contrast (…) the privilege against
self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth (…) [but]
stands as a protection of quite different constitutional values.”159 Thus the
right to silence is not legitimated on the grounds that it increases the
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reliability of findings of fact, but by values that reach beyond the proceeding.
The value worth protecting, according to the above-cited Tehan decision, is
the respect for personality and the private sphere.
According to the decision, one group of the procedural guarantees is made
up of the pure positive participatory rights, which help in determining the
truth. Through the application of these rights the veritably guilty are
convicted and suspicious but innocent persons are acquitted. In the other
group are those rights – the inviolability of home, of the private sphere, of
human dignity or of personal integrity – that embody non-procedural
(substantive) values. These rights do not enhance fact-finding accuracy and
are hence also unsuitable for protecting the innocent from wrongful
conviction. According to Tehan, therefore, the right to silence belongs in the
second group. The participatory rights are “unqualified” rights which may
not be limited in the name of other interests. In contrast the scope of those
rights protecting substantive values lying outside the criminal proceedings
may be limited by other rights or interests.
The right of silence, however, is not only meant to protect values that are
completely irrelevant with regard to fact-finding in the criminal process, and
the positive participatory rights are not justified on the grounds that they
ensure that the verdict will always reflect the truth.
We stated earlier that the norms meant to protect substantive values are
not due exclusively to criminal defendants. In the name of respecting her
privacy, the witness, too, may request not to be coerced to provide testimony
that would incriminate her. The freedom of conscience also prohibits
compelling a priest to violate the seal of confession. In all these cases,
“silence” is a hindrance to uncovering the truth and may result in convicting
an innocent who has fallen under suspicion.160
The “right to silence” due to a witness and to an accused do differ,
however. In the American and English literature and jurisprudence the
temptation for treating these two in the same way may lie in the fact that if
she chooses to speak the accused testifies as a witness. But in the
Anglo-American procedure, just as in the continental one, the witness refusal
to testify or to answer questions falls within the concept of an exemption or
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privilege,161 i.e. the privilege against self-incrimination. It is an advantage, an
exemption from doing something that is not due to other citizens or that in
other context must be done. The other party (the state) does have the right to
enforce the general obligation of citizens to testify. But if someone has an
exemption, she may refuse to answer. In Hohfeld’s classification this privilege
is up against the other party’s non-right.162 Through the privilege we recognize
the rights to private life and the right to preserve secrets. On matters falling
outside the range of secrets, however, the witness must testify. The accused’s
right to silence is – as we know – complete, while that of the witness is partial
only. The relevant issue is not the quantitative difference, however, but rather
the negative aspect of liberty that is embodied in the witness’s privilege which
represents a slice of human life that may not be subject to social control.163
This is what Isaiah Berlin defined as liberty from164 something: my right to be
left in peace, to be left alone in this one area whose boundaries, though they
may shift, can always be drawn at any given moment. My negative liberty
manifests itself as a duty on the other side to leave my private sphere
inviolate.
By not compelling the accused to speak, we of course leave her private
sphere undisturbed, too. But it is the positive notion of liberty that takes shape
in the accused’s right to silence. The positive aspect of liberty means that the
individual is her own master. I am free, I determine how I will live my life; my
decisions depend on myself and not on external forces. “I wish to be an
instrument on my own, not of other men’s acts of will. I wish to be a subject,
not an object. (…) I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding,
not being decided for.”165
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With the right to silence we recognize that the accused is a principal actor
with the power to shape the proceedings. The issue is not that we leave her
private sphere inviolate, but rather that we recognize her autonomy and
freedom of action. She decides how to shape her fate and how to exercise her
rights of defense. She makes her choices.166 It is precisely in Anglo-American
procedure, where the accused, if she speaks, does so as a witness, that the
distinction between the privilege of the witness and the accused’s right to
silence is most obvious. The witness has a duty to testify, but the respect for
her private sphere commands that she may not be compelled to make a
statement that would reveal her guilt. If the accused chooses to testify and
becomes a witness for the defense, she may not refuse to give answers by
pointing out that she would thereby incriminate herself. An accused choosing
to testify cannot demand anymore that her private sphere be respected. What
the accused is entitled to is the choice between the two options, and if she
pays the price for having chosen silence, then it is her right to be recognized
as a subject shaping the proceedings that is curtailed.167
Those rights that are exclusively meant to protect substantive values external
to the proceedings actually have nothing to do with fact-finding in the criminal
process and its outcome. The right of the accused to remain silent is not such a
right. The proposition in the Murphy judgment is correct: “the privilege, while
sometimes »a shelter to the guilty«, is often »a protection to the innocent«.”168
The right to silence – as a fairness norm –, as I have pointed out repeatedly, does
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not generally ensure that the truth will be established but that the facts will be
established correctly in the light of a prior evaluation. Its function is to provide
protection against the wrongful conviction of innocents, even at the price that
some guilty individuals will evade criminal liability. This is true for all fairness
norms. Previously I raised the accused’s right to question the witnesses
– especially her right to cross-examine incriminating witnesses – as an example.
Today we believe that Wigmore was wrong when he thought that cross-
examination is the most outstanding instrument of uncovering the truth.169
Nevertheless, cross-examination remains a fundamental procedural guarantee in
the Anglo-American system because it is unquestionably suitable for reducing
the probability of wrongful convictions. If we therefore relax the right to silence,
we do not generally increase the probability of correctly ascertaining the facts of
the case. What we do indisputably achieve is to reduce the number of those
guilty individuals who evade criminal punishment, but at the same time we
proportionally increase the probability of convicting innocents.
The notion that fairness rights are primarily meant to prevent wrongful
convictions, and that they only contribute to uncovering the “truth” through
this function, is also applicable to the right to counsel, invoked in the Tehan
decision. The probability of convicting veritably guilty individuals may be
increased by weakening this right as well. If we curtail the right to counsel,
then obviously fewer guilty persons will evade criminal liability – though
clearly this would also result in increasing the probability of wrongful
convictions.
If the involvement of counsel would generally ensure that the truth is
revealed, then the legislature would obviously not make occasional attempts
at curtailing this right. But this is exactly what it does from time to time. Let
us recall the Murray case: the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act
discussed therein allowed for preventing persons suspected of terrorist acts
from establishing contact with their legal representation for 48 hours, and it
did so by openly citing the interests of uncovering and prosecuting crimes.
The measure was clearly aimed at uncovering the truth and making sure that
guilty persons do not escape liability. Yet the European Court of Human
Rights found a violation of Article 6 (3) because the police exercised their
law-provided authority in the applicant’s case. To recall, however, at the same
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time the Court did not find it problematic that the domestic court drew
adverse inferences from the accused’s silence.
Why is it not problematic if the efficiency of law enforcement is achieved by
limiting the right to silence, which evidently also increases the probability of
erroneously convicting innocents? Why does it seem unacceptable that the same
objective be achieved by diluting another fairness right? The general notion that
the right to silence, as compared to the other component rights of fairness,
provides a weaker protection to the innocents may undoubtedly serve to mitigate
any bad conscience decision-makers might experience. If we want to increase the
probability of convicting the guilty, and in return we accept that there will be
innocent victims of such a process – thus we might argue – then we should do
this by curtailing a right that is less valuable than the others. The right to silence
is less valuable because it hardly contributes to revealing the truth nor does it
provide a very efficient protection against wrongful conviction.
But this would lead to a further devaluation of the right to silence, which in
turn might justify still further restrictions of it. I do not claim that this will
necessarily happen and there are some encouraging signs to the contrary. In
the Condron case170, the Court made clear that only with the application of
strict criteria may adverse inferences be drawn from the defendant’s silence.
Already in 1995 the United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed its
concerns that with the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, the
United Kingdom extended the scope of its regulation restricting the right to
silence – which had originally only applied to Northern Ireland – and in the
Committee’s opinion this violated several provisions of Article 14 of the
Covenant.171 When they took the position that silence may not be considered
as a circumstance indicating the guilt of the accused, it was probably a
concern for the future of the right to silence that motivated the drafters of
the Statute of the International Criminal Court as well.172 But the fact is that
there are attempts in national law and judicial practice to curtail the right to
silence. Those who exercise their right to remain silent have to be prepared to
pay a price. International human rights bodies will – I am afraid – in the
future have the opportunity to express their opinion on just how high this
price may go.
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